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The Constitutionalization of 
Fatherhood 
Dara E. Purvis† 
Abstract 
Beginning in the 1970s, the Supreme Court heard a series of 
challenges to family law statutes brought by unwed biological fathers, 
questioning the constitutionality of laws that treated unwed fathers 
differently than unwed mothers. The Court’s opinions created a starkly 
different constitutional status for unwed fathers than for unwed 
mothers, demanding additional actions and relationships before an 
unwed father was considered a constitutional father. 
Although state parentage statutes have progressed beyond their 
1970s incarnations, the doctrine created in those family law cases 
continues to have impact far beyond family law. Transmission of 
citizenship in the context of immigration law and the inheritance rights 
of children of unwed parents whose fathers died without a will echo the 
reasoning of the family law cases, including two unwed-father principles 
giving legal imprimatur to stereotypes about fathers. Across multiple 
areas of law, therefore, unwed fathers are not constitutional fathers. 
It is not enough, however, to simply revive past challenges to such 
statutes: separate criticisms of each line of cases have not prompted 
reconsideration of the cases reforming family law, immigration law, or 
inheritance law individually. This Article identifies a new approach 
using modern precedents to provide a clearer theory of 
constitutionalizing fathers: Obergefell v. Hodges illustrates a 
methodology of analyzing claims that involve the unequal application 
of a fundamental right, and Sessions v. Morales-Santana provides the 
substantive rejection of gendered, parental stereotypes that fills out 
Obergefell’s framework. The result is an unambiguous argument rooted 
in the Equal Protection Clause that will constitutionalize fathers across 
the law. 
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Introduction 
When is a biological father not a constitutional father? The answer 
is surprisingly simple: when he is unmarried. Unwed biological fathers 
are not parents under constitutional doctrine as outlined by the 
Supreme Court until they take actions far beyond those required of 
unwed biological mothers. 
Such unwed biological fathers may be legal fathers under state law 
identifying legal parents, so one might think that this gendered 
approach to constitutional parentage has been effectively mooted 
through legislative reform. The Supreme Court’s approval of gendered 
constitutional parental rights, however, extends into other areas of law 
where those areas intersect with determinations of parentage. For 
example, transmission of citizenship from one U.S. citizen parent does 
not rely upon any individual state’s laws as to legal parentage, and the 
gendered treatment of unwed fathers and mothers in family law cases 
has been imported to justify gendered treatment of unwed fathers in 
their ability to transmit American citizenship. Similarly, children who 
claim inheritance from an unwed father who died without a will face 
the same gendered logic imported from family law into inheritance law. 
The result is that unwed biological fathers are not constitutional 
fathers. Gender stereotypes about fathers in general have been used to 
justify treating unwed fathers starkly differently than unwed mothers. 
Previous challenges to such laws have used two different arguments: 
first, that the parent-child relationship is a fundamental right; and 
second, that such differential treatment violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. The challenges were largely unsuccessful, in part because courts 
used gender stereotypes positing that fathers and mothers are situated 
differently at birth to answer both claims, even as society and medical 
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technology have developed in ways that fundamentally undercut such 
stereotypes. 
Modern caselaw, however, provides a clearer approach. Obergefell 
v. Hodges1 addressed an argument involving the combination of due 
process and equal protection issues, in which the fundamental right of 
marriage was unequally made available according to the gender of the 
spouses. The case demonstrates a methodology for such joint claims, 
focusing attention upon the message and effect of the unequal 
application of a fundamental right. Furthermore, Sessions v. Morales-
Santana,2 which assessed a statute related to the transmission of 
citizenship, provides the substantive evidence of the unconstitutional 
stereotypes upon which gendered parental status relies. 
Gendered treatment of unwed parents is unconstitutional, most 
clearly so under the Equal Protection Clause. This Article demonstrates 
the harm of the existing constitutional doctrine and outlines a path to 
addressing it. Part I addresses the family law treatment of unwed 
parenthood; it describes both the statutory definitions of legal 
parenthood and Supreme Court cases approving of a starkly different 
constitutional parental right for unwed fathers and mothers. This Part 
also traces the development of the unwed-father principles to two key 
assumptions about fathers and mothers upon which family law and 
other fields rely. Part II illustrates the impact of family law 
constitutional doctrine upon other areas of law, using the examples of 
transmission of citizenship and intestate inheritance rights to show the 
ongoing effects of the earlier family law cases. In particular, the unwed-
father principles are cited again and again outside of family law to 
justify continued gendered treatment of unwed fathers. Part III outlines 
how to equalize treatment of unwed fathers and mothers and 
constitutionalize fathers, using Obergefell v. Hodges and Sessions v. 
Morales-Santana to map out a modern understanding of the Equal 
Protection Clause’s application to parentage statutes. 
I.  Equal Protection Issues in the Law of Parentage 
Status as a legal parent is an odd legal creation in many ways. Most 
of the time, it is established through a largely invisible, uncontested, 
and informal process, although it is one of the most significant legal 
statuses that a person can hold. The methods and rules by which a 
person either self-identifies or is identified by a court as a parent are 
set by state statutes, yet one of the oldest fundamental rights identified 
by the Supreme Court is the fundamental right inherent in the parent-
child relationship.3 This Part outlines some of the statutory paths to 
 
1. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
2. 137 S. Ct. 1678 (2017). 
3. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
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parenthood, then explains why the constitutional status of parenthood 
is completely different than the statutory paths. Furthermore, the 
Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed different constitutional paths 
to parenthood for mothers and fathers. By approving starkly different 
treatment of unwed fathers and mothers, the Supreme Court has 
labeled unwed fathers non-constitutional parents lacking constitutional 
rights and status. 
A.  The Progressive Nature of Statutory Parenthood 
Every state has statutes defining legal parentage, specifying 
multiple ways in which an adult could assert their status as a legal 
parent to a specific child. The ways that an adult might claim status 
as a parent have multiplied in recent decades due to state legislatures 
adding new rules in a sedimentary process as the social acceptance of 
families and new fertility technologies developed. While parentage 
statutes have been generally progressive, the process of individually 
revising state laws results in some variety among states as to who is a 
legal parent; particularly in newer contexts such as surrogacy,4 as well 
as contexts in which multiple rules identify multiple parents.5 
The oldest rule is the most common-sense rule of thumb: a woman 
giving birth is the mother of that child.6 The marital presumption adds 
to identification of the mother; it establishes that when a child is born 
to a married woman, her husband is the legal father.7 Because of the 
historical stigma against illegitimacy, the marital presumption was 
applied very broadly, even in circumstances where the husband’s 
biological paternity was unlikely.8 This also made sense in a world 
lacking reliable and accessible genetic tests, as presumably most of the 
time the marital presumption could serve as a proxy for genetic  
4. See Dara E. Purvis, Intended Parents and the Problem of Perspective, 24 
Yale J.L. & Feminism 210, 232–34 (2012). 
5. The vast majority of states cap the number of legal parents at two, 
meaning that if parentage statutes identify more than two possible legal 
parents, a further winnowing must take place. California, however, 
recently enacted legislation allowing a child to have more than two legal 
parents, meaning that the multiple rules of parentage can result in three 
or more parents. Cal. Fam. Code Ann. § 7612(c) (2017). 
6. This is a bit of an oversimplification at the modern and ancient ends; 
today, this rule is complicated with the development of surrogacy, and 
historically a child born to an unmarried woman was filius nullius, or the 
legal child of no one. See Katharine K. Baker, The DNA Default and Its 
Discontents: Establishing Modern Parenthood, 96 B.U. L. Rev. 2037, 
2043 (2016). 
7. Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption 
of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 227, 232–
34 (2006). 
8. See id.  
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fatherhood. As the availability of genetic tests expanded, however, 
states retained the marital presumption and added proof of genetic 
connection as another method to establish parentage.9 
Reforms over the last few decades have complicated the picture 
even further. As it became more common for people to use donated 
sperm and eggs in the process of having children, states added 
provisions to their laws to establish that donors who used the services 
of fertility clinics or other medical professionals to provide their 
donations were excluded from the possibility of being identified as legal 
parents, along with the attendant responsibilities such as child 
support.10 Similarly, as the use of surrogates to carry pregnancies to 
term became more widely available and utilized, some states established 
rules regarding whether surrogates would be identified or excluded from 
status as legal parents.11 There are thus multiple entrances to the status 
of legal parent (giving birth, the marital presumption, genetic 
connection, etc.), as well as possible exits from that status (if the 
potential parent worked with a fertility clinic or other medical 
professional to donate gametes or serve as a surrogate). 
This reformation process, while significant, remains incomplete and 
ongoing. For example, some of the most notable current proposed 
changes appear in the most recent revisions to the Uniform Parentage 
Act (UPA),12 drafted to serve as a model statute for state legislatures. 
The 2017 UPA makes a variety of progressive steps—notably, it 
eliminates gender as it appeared in the previous UPA, equalizing the 
treatment of men and women as they are identified as mothers and 
fathers.13 Such amendments are a significant step, but will not change 
statutes overnight. The UPA is used only as a model for state 
legislatures and is not itself binding law. 
Additionally, an important counterweight to reform efforts is the 
lasting effect of gender stereotypes. When state legislatures are 
considering whether to reform parentage statutes, societal expectations 
about parents and gender roles sometimes work against proposed 
amendments.14 Because parentage statutes originated at a time that 
 
9. David D. Meyer, Parenthood in a Time of Transition: Tensions Between 
Legal, Biological, and Social Conceptions of Parenthood, 54 Am. J. 
Comp. L. 125, 125̄–26 (2006). 
10. Id. at 134. 
11. Purvis, supra note 4, at 232–34. 
12. Unif. Parentage Act (Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. 
State Laws 2017). 
13. Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parenthood Through the UPA (2017), 127 
Yale L.J. F. 589, 592 (2018). 
14. Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 Yale L.J. 2260, 2268 
(2017). 
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contemplated only heterosexual parents,15 parentage laws were built 
upon stereotypes about the gendered nature of parenthood, in which 
mothers are the first and closest parent.16 As Douglas NeJaime recently 
described, this stereotype views mothers as “the parental figure who 
establishes the family,” whereas fathers are “a secondary, optional 
parent, potentially supplementing but certainly not replacing the 
mother.”17 
Such stereotypes are not necessarily consciously incorporated, and 
sometimes rules that grew from gender stereotypes can have progressive 
effects in modern contexts. The marital presumption provides a good 
example of the complex push and pull of statutory reform. On the one 
hand, broader application of the marital presumption can have a 
liberalizing effect. Applying the marital presumption to same-sex 
couples may break the presumption away from the historical foundation 
of heterosexual couples and convert the rule into a source of 
nonbiological parenthood.18 On the other hand, Clare Huntington has 
pointed out that the continued vitality of marital family law “wreaks 
havoc” on nonmarital families who are governed by completely different 
rules.19 Huntington argues: 
[T]o put married and unmarried parents on level playing ground, 
it is essential to disrupt the formal relationship between marriage 
and parental rights. The most direct way to do so is to eliminate 
the marital presumption. This legal rule is a shortcut that was 
originally designed to promote marital harmony and protect 
children from being rendered illegitimate. But at a time when 
illegitimacy carries little legal stigma, the marital presumption 
unnecessarily privileges marital families at the expense of 
nonmarital families.20 
As a result of the incomplete process of reform, many scholars have 
proposed additional modifications to existing parentage laws. Martha 
Fineman has suggested focusing on the importance of the parent-child 
dyad, rather than the horizontal relationship between parents.21 Others  
15. Id. at 2323.  
16. Id. at 2328–29.  
17. Id. at 2329.  
18. See Douglas NeJaime, The Family’s Constitution, 32 Const. Comment. 
413, 438–39 (2017). 
19. Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for 
Nonmarital Families, 67 Stan. L. Rev. 167, 171 (2015). 
20. Id. at 225 (citations omitted).  
21. See generally Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother, 
the Sexual Family, and Other Twentieth Century Tragedies 
(1995). 
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proposals center on the act of caregiving more generally, without such 
a strong focus on genetic connections.22 Clare Huntington and Merle 
Weiner argue that a better state goal would be to facilitate co-
parenting, either completely separated from any marital or romantic 
relationship23 or encouraging co-parents to try to remain in a romantic 
relationship and treating the parent-partner relationship as legally 
significant.24 
Underlying all parentage statutes are constitutional rights. One is 
the fundamental right to the care, custody, and control of one’s 
children.25 Another is the Equal Protection Clause’s guarantee of equal 
treatment under the law, applied with heightened scrutiny to laws that 
treat men and women differently.26 Even as parentage statutes progress, 
they are undergirded by a constitutional law doctrine that is slower to 
evolve. The next section addresses the gendered nature of parental 
constitutional rights, identifying unwed mothers as constitutional 
mothers long before unwed fathers gain commensurate status as 
constitutional fathers. 
B.  The Unequal Nature of Constitutional Parenthood 
Even as legal parentage is recognized and arguably created by state 
law, there is a fundamental substantive due process constitutional right 
inherent in parentage, and choices about when to become a parent must 
not violate principles of equal protection.27 Both constitutional rights 
are implicated in the treatment of unwed biological fathers, whose 
status as legal and constitutional parents has been particularly 
unclear.28 Historically, unwed biological fathers had no legal tie to their 
children.29 By the mid-twentieth century this had changed, at least to  
22. See generally Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 Mich. L. 
Rev. 189 (2007); Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 
11 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 307 (2004). 
23. See Huntington, supra note 19, at 173.  
24. See generally Merle H. Weiner, A Parent-Partner Status for 
American Family Law (2015); see also Dara E. Purvis, A Parent-
Partner Status for American Family Law by Merle H. Weiner, 31 
Berkeley J. Gender L. & Just. 378, 379–80 (2016) (book review). 
25. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000). 
26. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996). 
27. See David D. Meyer, The Constitutionalization of Family Law, 42 Fam. 
L.Q. 529, 533–34 (2008) (discussing the Court’s recognition of several 
constitutional rights related to family law and recounting the Equal 
Protection Clause’s bearing on family law). 
28. See Joanna L. Grossman, Constitutional Parentage, 32 Const. 
Comment. 307, 314–15 (2017). 
29. See Baker, supra note 6, at 2043 (“A child born to a woman without a 
legally recognized partner was filius nullius, a child of no one.”). 
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the extent that unwed mothers could seek declarations of parentage and 
child support from the biological fathers.30 Society also began to change, 
such that many unwed fathers chose to maintain relationships with 
their children. State statutes, however, did not reform to keep pace with 
societal evolution, nor were increases in unwed mothers’ ability to 
impose responsibility on unwed fathers accompanied by increases in the 
ability of unwed fathers to voluntarily shoulder that responsibility with 
legal parental status. In the 1970s, a series of unwed fathers challenged 
such state laws, asserting that gendered laws violated the Equal 
Protection Clause and failure to provide avenues for unwed fathers to 
assert parental rights violated the Due Process Clause. The Supreme 
Court issued decidedly mixed opinions, leading to a modern doctrine 
that condones significant differences in the constitutional status of 
mothers and fathers. 
The first case arose in Illinois, where Peter Stanley fathered three 
children with Joan Stanley. The two were in a romantic relationship 
for almost two decades, and lived together intermittently.31 At the time, 
Illinois law provided that the children of an unmarried woman became 
wards of the state if the mother died.32 Even though Peter Stanley had 
been in his children’s lives as a father, the law meant that after Joan 
died the children were taken into the custody of the state, which 
appointed guardians for the children rather than allowing the children 
to live with their father.33 
Stanley argued that the Illinois law violated the Equal Protection 
Clause due to its unequal treatment of unmarried fathers as compared 
to married fathers and unmarried mothers, who did not similarly lose 
custody of their children if their co-parent died.34 Other parents only 
lost custody if the State showed that they were unfit parents through 
a child protective action, which gave a parent notice and an opportunity 
to argue that they were fit to retain custody at a hearing.35 By contrast, 
Illinois presumed that all unwed fathers were unfit parents.36 
Although Stanley consistently presented his case as a challenge 
under the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme Court instead 
 
30. See Katharine K. Baker, Homogenous Rules for Heterogeneous Families: 
The Standardization of Family Law When There Is No Standard Family, 
2012 U. Ill. L. Rev. 319, 327–28 (2012). 
31. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 646 (1972). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. at 650. 
36. Id.  
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analyzed his claim under the Due Process Clause.37 The difference 
meant that rather than compare unmarried fathers to other parents 
(and ask whether a constitutionally salient difference existed between 
the groups), the Court asked whether unwed fathers had any 
constitutional interest that required some process before Illinois could 
take the interest away. Justice White’s opinion for the Court answered 
immediately that unwed fathers did hold a constitutional interest, 
speaking generally of the importance of the family38 and more 
specifically of the interest of a father in “children he has sired and 
raised.”39 Framing Stanley’s interest as a due process argument also 
meant that White set Stanley’s interest in his relationship with his 
children against the State’s interest in protecting the children of 
Illinois.40 There was no alternative father available in the form of a 
second man claiming to be the children’s father––indeed, the alternative 
to Stanley was to place the children in the custody of the State, with 
all the accompanying financial and bureaucratic costs.41 Furthermore, 
Illinois’s interest was to protect children from the care of unfit parents, 
which Justice White argued was not served by separating children from 
fit parents.42 The Illinois statute furthered child protective goals only if 
all unmarried fathers were unfit parents.43 
Reduced to such an extreme summary, one might expect the Court 
to conclude that such a far-reaching generalization about unwed fathers 
was so inaccurate and demeaning that it violated principles of equal 
protection. Justice White, however, took a more moderate tone: 
It may be, as the State insists, that most unmarried fathers are 
unsuitable and neglectful parents. It may also be that Stanley is 
such a parent and that his children should be placed in other 
hands. But all unmarried fathers are not in this category; some 
are wholly suited to have custody of their children.44 
The Court’s opinion concluded that the administrative convenience 
of assuming all unmarried fathers were unfit parents could not justify 
denying Peter Stanley and similarly situated fathers a hearing as to 
 
37. Id. at 659–60 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (making note of the discrepancy 
between the legal theory argued by Stanley and the theory applied by the 
Court). 
38. Id. at 650–52 (White, J., majority). 
39. Id. at 651.  
40. Id. at 652. 
41. See id. at 646. 
42. Id. at 652–53. 
43. Id. at 653. 
44. Id. at 654. 
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parental fitness before taking their children into the custody of the 
state.45 Justice White mentioned the Equal Protection Clause at the 
very end of his opinion, noting that because all parents were entitled to 
a hearing under the Due Process Clause to determine their fitness before 
removing children from the home, denying a hearing to unwed fathers 
(but not married fathers or unwed mothers) violated the Equal 
Protection Clause.46 
Chief Justice Burger dissented and focused on the difference 
between married and unmarried fathers. Pointing out that Stanley had 
framed his argument under the Equal Protection Clause,47 Burger 
turned fully to the significant differences he saw between married and 
unmarried fathers. Burger argued that marriage created “legally 
enforceable rights and duties” between spouses and between parents 
and children, and argued that Stanley failed to “seek the burdens” of 
those legally enforceable duties by marrying Joan Stanley.48 The 
“voluntary” method by which a man could secure legal status as parent 
was to marry the mother of his children.49 Because Stanley had failed 
to do so, he had demonstrated a lack of commitment to his children.50 
Burger continued to explain the different rights of unmarried 
mothers versus fathers in terms that the Court would repeat over and 
over in later cases. The argument relies on two claims about the relative 
roles of unwed mothers and fathers, which I will call the “unwed-father 
principles.” Principle one has to do with how easily and immediately a 
biological mother can be identified, versus how a biological father can 
prove his genetic link. Burger argued that unmarried mothers were 
immediately identifiable from the moment of giving birth, whereas 
unmarried fathers had no similar and clear method of identification.51 
“Many” unwed fathers, in Burger’s summary, might not even be aware 
that they had fathered a child out of wedlock, so identifying such 
fathers would involve tracking men down before administering a 
paternity test.52 The first unwed-father principle is thus the biological 
unwed-father principle, assuming that the biological mother-child 
 
45. Id. at 657–58. 
46. Id. at 658. 
47. Id. at 659 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
48. Id. at 663–64. 
49. Id. at 664. 
50. Id. at 667. There is some evidence that Chief Justice Burger’s concern 
regarding Peter Stanley as a father was justified. See Josh Gupta-Kagan, 
Stanley v. Illinois’s Untold Story, 24 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 773, 
781 (2016). 
51. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 665 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
52. Id. 
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relationship is easy to prove, and the biological father-child relationship 
much more difficult. 
The second unwed-father principle voices a stereotype of fathers as 
uninvolved parents who are likely to evade responsibility and avoid 
creating a relationship with their child: the stereotype unwed-father 
principle. Burger cited “common human experience” for the proposition 
that “the biological role of the mother in carrying and nursing an infant 
creates stronger bonds between her and the child than the bonds 
resulting from the male’s often casual encounter.”53 Records from the 
case indicate that Burger’s dissent chose more moderate language than 
other Justices––Justice Douglas initially drafted an opinion that 
described Stanley and other unwed fathers as “hit-and-run drivers.”54 
Burger argued that the commitment-free status of unmarried fathers 
was enough to reject Stanley’s challenge under the Equal Protection 
Clause, using gender stereotypes about men and fathers to reject an 
equality-based argument. 
Despite Peter Stanley’s ostensible victory before the Supreme 
Court, the case is not a full-throated defense of unwed fathers. The 
decision vindicated the right of all parents to be granted a minimal 
amount of due process before losing custody of their children but 
underscored that the generalization that unwed fathers do not care for 
their children may be true. Additionally, the case was decided by a 
seven-member Court, which at the end of the initial conference reached 
a very different decision: four Justices would have dismissed the writ of 
certiorari as improvidently granted, with one dissenter who wanted to 
rule for Illinois and two who wanted to rule for Stanley.55 A series of 
vote switches resulted in Justice White’s decision ruling nominally in 
favor of Stanley, but no clear majority existed that seemed willing to 
support the rights of unwed fathers in later cases.56 Finally, the primary 
discussion of Stanley’s equal protection claims occurred in dissents 
arguing that no equal protection violation occurred, laying out the 
unwed-father principles, and voicing clear gendered stereotypes about 
fathers.57 
A few years later, a pair of cases demonstrated the Court’s weak 
conception of the constitutional rights of unwed fathers. The first was 
Quilloin v. Walcott,58 decided in 1978. Leon Quilloin and Ardell Walcott 
had a child together in December 1964, but never lived together, and 
 
53. Id. 
54. Gupta-Kagan, supra note 50, at 793. 
55. Id. at 798. 
56. See id. at 798–802. 
57. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 663–67 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).  
58. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
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their romantic relationship did not continue for long.59 Ardell married 
Randall Walcott in 1967, and the child lived with Ardell and Randall 
from that point on.60 Quilloin had a relationship with his child, but 
provided support irregularly, and as the child’s relationship with 
Randall Walcott strengthened, Ardell decided that Quilloin’s visits with 
the child were disrupting the Walcott family and the child in 
particular.61 Additionally, Randall Walcott wished to formally adopt 
the child,62 and the child agreed that he wanted to be adopted and to 
have the last name Walcott.63 
Randall Walcott filed a petition to adopt the child in 1976, which 
Quilloin opposed, filing a petition to be legitimated as the child’s father, 
an objection to the adoption petition, and a request for visitation 
rights.64 Had Quilloin and Ardell Walcott been married when their child 
was born, Quilloin would have had to consent or otherwise surrender 
his parental rights in order for Randall Walcott’s adoption petition to 
be approved.65 Under Georgia state law, however, adoption of a child 
born to unmarried parents needed only the mother’s approval, and not 
the father’s.66 Quilloin argued that this unequal requirement of parental 
consent violated both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses.67 
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, rejected both 
arguments. The Court agreed that taking children away from “a natural 
family” without a demonstration that the parents were unfit would 
violate the Due Process Clause.68 The Court implicitly criticized 
Quilloin’s role as father, however, by noting that he had never 
petitioned to be recognized as the child’s legal father before, nor had he 
previously requested visitation or custody.69 Furthermore, the child 
would not be removed from Quilloin’s care and placed in the custody 
of strangers, as with Peter Stanley’s children. Instead, the child would 
remain living with Randall and Ardell Walcott, who had been raising 
the child for many years together, “a result desired by all concerned, 
 
59. Id. at 247. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 251.  
62. See id. at 247.  
63. Id. at 251. 
64. Id. at 247, 249–50. 
65. Id. at 248. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 252. 
68. Id. at 255 (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 862–
63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment)).  
69. Id. 
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except [Quilloin].”70 Justice Marshall did not explain why Quilloin’s 
fundamental parentage right would vary according to the alternative 
custody option available for his child, other than noting that “the result 
of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit 
already in existence.”71 Randall Walcott, by voluntarily assuming the 
responsibilities of parenthood and legally binding himself to the child’s 
mother, was apparently in the eyes of the Court a better father than 
Quilloin. 
Quilloin’s Equal Protection Clause argument fared no better. He 
argued that he should have the same ability to veto an adoption by 
withholding his consent as a married father, a divorced father, or an 
unwed mother could, and to give unwed fathers less power over 
adoptions of their children did not give him equal protection of the 
laws.72 Again the Court disagreed, focusing on Quilloin’s failure to 
assume the quotidian responsibilities of parenthood by implicitly 
invoking the second-stereotype unwed-father principle. Having “never 
shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily 
supervision, education, protection, or care of the child,”73 the Court 
reasoned, he was properly distinguished from a married father, who 
would have been engaged in a child’s daily care. Because Quilloin’s 
individual relationship with his child did not resemble that of the 
hypothetical, stereotypical married father, Quilloin’s unwed fatherhood 
was saliently different than, and inferior to, married fatherhood and 
could thus be constitutionally treated differently by Georgia law. The 
somewhat implicit skepticism towards unwed fathers generally 
expressed in Stanley thus found an individual example, and more 
explicit expression, in the Court’s criticism of Quilloin. Even though he 
had provided support to his child and had a relationship with his child, 
Quilloin’s commitment to his child was not the same as Randall 
Walcott’s commitment to the family through marriage to Ardell. 
Quilloin’s unwed fatherhood was fundamentally inferior to Randall 
Walcott’s married fatherhood. 
Only one year later, however, the Court faced a case with another 
unwed father whose relationship with his child was even stronger. 
Abdiel Caban and Maria Mohammed lived together for five years, and 
although they never married, apparently told others that they were 
spouses.74 During the time that they lived together, they had two 
 
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 252. 
73. Id. at 256. 
74. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382 (1979). Caban and Mohammed 
could not legally marry at the time of their relationship, as Caban was 
separated from a wife who he did not divorce until 1974. Id. 
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children. Caban was listed as the father on the birth certificate for both 
children, and the four lived together as a family until the end of 1973. 
At that point, Maria Mohammed moved out with the children to live 
with Kazim Mohammed, who she married the next month.75 Every 
weekend Maria Mohammed brought the two children to visit her 
mother, who lived in the same building as Caban, and the grandmother 
allowed Caban to visit the children each week. These visits continued 
for nine months, until the grandmother moved to Puerto Rico, taking 
the two children with her at Mohammed’s request.76 The next year, 
Caban visited the children in Puerto Rico, where he took them for what 
the grandmother believed would be a short visit.77 Instead, Caban took 
the children back home with him to New York.78 Mohammed then filed 
for custody in New York state court.79 
As the custody fight between Mohammed and Caban progressed, 
both sides filed a petition for a second parent adoption by each parent’s 
new partner: the Mohammeds, with stepfather Kazim Mohammed 
seeking to adopt, and the Cabans, with Abdiel’s new wife Nina as the 
potential new mother.80 As in Quilloin, New York law required the 
consent of an unwed mother for any adoption petition of her children, 
thus preventing Nina Caban’s petition from proceeding.81 Similarly, 
New York did not require the consent of an unwed father to approve 
the adoption of his children, but the unwed father was entitled to speak 
at a hearing evaluating the proposed adoption.82 The hearing, however, 
was not as to his own status as a parent or whether he was a good 
father with rights to his children—instead, the hearing asked simply 
whether it was in the best interests of a child to be adopted by the 
prospective adoptive parents.83 A Surrogate for a New York Family 
Court thus heard evidence presented by Caban, but only to the extent 
that Caban spoke to Kazim Mohammed’s qualifications as a prospective 
father, and granted Mohammed’s petition.84 Following Quilloin, Caban 
 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. at 383. 
78. Id.  
79. Id. 
80. See id. 
81. Id. at 384. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 386–87. 
84. Id. at 384. 
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argued that this process violated the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses.85 
In a sharp departure from previous cases, a 5–4 Court held that it 
was “clear that [New York law] treats unmarried parents differently 
according to their sex.”86 Caban is the only unwed father case in which 
the Supreme Court found an equal protection violation as the 
dispositive holding. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, rejected 
the distinction as the Quilloin Court characterized it, between unwed 
fathers and other parents (including married fathers, married mothers, 
and unmarried mothers).87 Instead, Powell wrote that the relevant 
distinction was between unmarried mothers and unmarried fathers, 
meaning that in order to withstand Caban’s challenge, New York’s law 
must withstand intermediate scrutiny.88 
New York argued that its different treatment of unwed mothers 
and fathers was substantially related to an important state interest 
because the law recognized the “fundamental difference” between 
mothers and fathers embodied in the second-stereotype unwed-father 
principle, that a biological mother is simply closer to her child than a 
biological father.89 The majority opinion in Caban rejected this 
argument, but crucially did not reject the stereotype unwed-father 
principle altogether. Instead, the Court relied on the individual 
circumstances of Abdiel Caban. The Court found that Caban’s history 
“demonstrate[d] that an unwed father may have a relationship with his 
children fully comparable to that of the mother.”90 The Court spoke 
approvingly of Caban’s role supporting and caring for his children, 
particularly as they “lived together as a natural family for several 
years.”91 Powell thus rejected the proposition of a “universal difference 
between maternal and paternal relations at every phase of a child’s 
development.”92 Notably, however, the Court mentioned that Caban’s 
children were four and six years old by the time the adoption petitions 
were filed, meaning that Caban had cared for them and stood in a role 
very similar to that of a married father for a significant portion of their 
 
85. Id. at 385. 
86. Id. at 388. 
87. Id. at 393–94.  
88. Id. at 388 (reiterating the intermediate scrutiny standard from Craig v. 
Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976), that “Gender-based distinctions ‘must 
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially 
related to achievement of those objectives’”). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 389.  
91. Id. 
92. Id. (emphasis added). 
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lives.93 Even as the Court rejected the universal stereotype, it 
acknowledged a possibility that the stereotype could be true at certain 
ages, specifically mentioning newborn infants versus older children.94 
Two Justices wrote dissents, and both argued that differences 
between unwed mothers and fathers justified different treatment under 
New York law. Justice Stewart explained that even though the Equal 
Protection Clause triggered heightened scrutiny for at least some sex-
based classifications, “gender-based classifications are not invariably 
invalid. When men and women are not in fact similarly situated in the 
area covered by the legislation in question, the Equal Protection Clause 
is not violated.”95 He viewed parenthood as an area in which men and 
women were fundamentally differently situated according to the first 
biological unwed-father principle: the parental relationship of a mother 
who gave birth to a child was clear, whereas a father’s status as parent 
had to be demonstrated through other methods.96 Stewart argued that 
both the physical and social realities that women were immediately 
identified as a parent justified granting unwed mothers greater power 
to veto potential adoption of their child.97 
Justice Stevens agreed with this analysis in his own dissent, which 
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist joined.98 Stevens focused on 
the mother’s unilateral power during pregnancy––she could decide 
whether to terminate the pregnancy without interference or input from 
the biological father, and controlled his later parental status by 
choosing whether to tell the biological father that she was pregnant and 
deciding whether to marry the biological father during her pregnancy.99 
Echoing Stewart, Stevens reasoned that the mother would be 
immediately identified as a parent at birth, and would almost certainly 
have custody of the child from that moment.100 Given that the mother 
had already been making decisions about the child from the moment of 
conception, Stevens argued that New York’s law merely reflected the 
existing state of affairs in which the mother was the primary and 
perhaps only decisionmaker as to the child’s care.101 
Although Abdiel Caban was successful before the Supreme Court, 
he won by a razor-thin majority. Stevens’ dissent acknowledged that  
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. at 398 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
96. Id. at 398–99.  
97. Id. at 399. 
98. Id. at 401 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
99. Id. at 404–05. 
100. Id. at 405. 
101. Id. at 406. 
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Caban’s longstanding relationship with his children could make Caban 
an exception to the unwed-father principles rather than a rule that 
unwed fathers should have rights coextensive with unwed mothers.102 
Justice Stevens’s dissent observing that unwed mothers already had 
control over the relationship between unwed fathers and children was 
prophetic, as demonstrated in the 1983 case Lehr v. Robertson.103 
Jonathan Lehr had been living with Lorraine Robertson for about two 
years when Lorraine gave birth to their daughter Jessica.104 When 
Lorraine was discharged from the hospital after birth, she fled with 
Jessica and concealed her location from Lehr.105 Lehr eventually hired 
a detective agency to locate Jessica and Lorraine, who by that time had 
married Richard Robertson.106 Lehr claimed that Lorraine refused to 
allow him to contact Jessica, rejected his attempts to provide child 
support, and filed an adoption petition to allow Richard Robertson to 
adopt Jessica.107 The petition was approved a few months later, and 
Lehr later filed a lawsuit challenging the adoption.108 
Under New York law, Lehr was not entitled even to notice of the 
adoption proceeding. Several categories of potential unwed fathers were 
notified if an adoption petition was filed concerning their child: men 
who had entered themselves into the state putative father registry, men 
who were listed as the father on a child’s birth certificate, men living 
with the mother and representing themselves as the father in public 
after the child’s birth, and others.109 Lehr did not fit into any of the 
categories, so received neither notice of the adoption nor an opportunity 
to be heard at the adoption proceeding.110 As with previous appellants, 
Lehr argued that this unconstitutionally infringed upon his 
fundamental relationship with Jessica under the Due Process Clause, 
and that treating unwed fathers differently than unwed mothers and 
married fathers violated the Equal Protection Clause.111 
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court and rejected both 
arguments. Regarding Lehr’s argument that he had a fundamental right 
as to his relationship with Jessica, Stevens drew a line between Stanley 
 
102. Id. at 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  
103. 463 U.S. 248 (1983). 
104. Id. at 268–69 (White, J., dissenting). 
105. Id. at 269. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 250, 255 (majority opinion). 
109. Id. at 250–51. 
110. Id. at 251–52. 
111. Id. at 249–50. 
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and Caban on one side and Quilloin and Lehr on the other. Peter 
Stanley and Abdiel Caban had existing parental relationships with their 
children, created through everyday caregiving and commitment to the 
child over the passage of time.112 Stevens wrote that when such a father 
“demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood” 
by helping to raise his child, “his interest in personal contact with his 
child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause.”113 
Fathers such as Jonathan Lehr or Leon Quilloin, however, who failed 
to step up and care for their children, who lacked an emotional 
relationship in addition to a biological one, did not hold a fundamental 
right.  
It was irrelevant, apparently, that Lehr had been prevented from 
creating such a relationship by Lorraine Robertson; most of the facts 
explaining that she had fled with Jessica appeared only in Justice 
White’s dissent. The dissent argued that because Lehr had never been 
allowed to present a factual case, the Court should have assumed that 
his rendition of the facts was accurate, “that but for the actions of the 
child’s mother there would have been the kind of significant relationship 
that the majority concedes is entitled to the full panoply of procedural 
due process protections.”114 In Justice Stevens’s eyes, by contrast, Lehr 
had failed to take what actions he could, even in Lorraine and Jessica’s 
absence, such as placing his name on New York’s putative father 
registry.115 In the context of Lehr’s equal protection challenge, the Court 
referred to the same perceived difference between mothers and fathers 
that previous cases described: unwed mothers and fathers were not 
“similarly situated with regard to their relationship with the child,” so 
the Constitution did not mandate equal treatment.116 
The Court’s opinion focused, as it did in previous cases, on the 
individual circumstances of Jonathan Lehr, albeit only to a point. It 
was constitutionally significant, even determinative, that Lehr did not 
have a substantial relationship with Jessica: because he had not acted 
like a father, he had no rights of a father. This context, however, did 
not stretch to the reason that Lehr had not created such a relationship, 
which, at least by his account, was that Lorraine had knowingly 
prevented any relationship from the beginning.117 But at least to some 
 
112. Id. at 261. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 270–71 (White, J., dissenting). 
115. Id. at 264 (majority opinion). 
116. Id. at 267–68. 
117. Lorraine may well have had good reasons for doing so—for example, one 
could speculate that Lorraine fled an abusive relationship in order to 
protect Jessica. Justice White’s dissent is correct, however, that neither 
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readers, it seemed clear that if an unwed father had acted like a father 
and created a relationship with his child through caregiving and 
providing support, the Court would recognize that the father had a 
fundamental right in that relationship. 
A few years later, the Court placed a large asterisk on that 
proposition. In Michael H. v. Gerald D.,118 an even more dramatic and 
complex set of adult relationships circled around a child’s parentage. 
The mother was Carole D., married to Gerald D.119 Carole had an 
extramarital affair with Michael H., which resulted in the birth of 
Victoria in 1981.120 Carole and Gerald entered Gerald’s name on 
Victoria’s birth certificate as the father, and Gerald always presented 
Victoria publicly as his own child.121 Michael knew, however, shortly 
after Victoria’s birth that he was likely the biological father, which was 
later confirmed by a blood test.122 
Carole moved with Victoria several times in the next few years, 
reflecting what relationship Carole was in: they lived for significant 
periods of time with Michael, during which time he treated Victoria as 
his daughter and presented her as such publicly, but Carole and 
Victoria also lived with Gerald during attempts to reconcile, as well as 
with a third man with whom Carole also had a relatively brief 
relationship.123 During one of the times when Carole lived with Michael, 
they both signed a stipulation that he was Victoria’s father, but Carole 
left Michael the next month and told her attorneys not to file the 
stipulation.124 Eventually Carole reconciled with Gerald, moved back in 
with him on a long-term basis, and they had two children together.125 
After Michael and Carole’s relationship ended, he began to seek 
visitation rights with Victoria.126 Gerald intervened in the case and 
argued that under California law, there were no triable issues of fact as 
to Victoria’s paternity––Gerald was the legal father, so Michael had no 
 
side had ever presented facts either substantiating Lehr’s story or 
explaining Lorraine’s actions.  
118. 491 U.S. 110 (1989).  
119. Id. at 113. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 113–14. 
122. Id. at 114. 
123. Id.  
124. Id. at 114–15. 
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right to ask for visitation.127 Gerald’s motion was granted, and Michael’s 
challenges to it eventually worked their way up to the Supreme Court. 
The underlying statute was California’s marital presumption, 
providing that the child of a married woman living with her husband 
was “conclusively presumed to be a child of the marriage,” meaning 
that husband and wife were legal father and mother.128 The presumption 
could be overcome by introducing blood tests as evidence showing that 
another man was the biological father, but only the husband or the 
mother were empowered to introduce such evidence.129 
Despite having such blood tests showing that he was Victoria’s 
biological father, therefore, Michael had no way of introducing them 
into evidence or otherwise disturbing the presumption that Gerald was 
Victoria’s father. Michael argued that this violated the Due Process 
clause, both as a procedural and substantive matter. The Court swiftly 
rejected Michael’s procedural claim,130 and the vast majority of the 
decision focused on Michael’s argument as to fundamental rights. 
Michael’s argument was very predictable based on the precedent of 
Lehr: he was the unwed biological father of Victoria, had voluntarily 
taken on his role and responsibilities as her father, and had created a 
substantial relationship with her. In his view, this placed him in the 
same position as Stanley and Caban, holding a fundamental 
constitutional right in his relationship with Victoria.131 
Justice Scalia, writing for a 5–4 Court, disagreed. Scalia reasoned 
that the fundamental parental right protected by the Constitution 
protected “traditional” marital families, not families made up of unwed 
(or adulterous) parents.132 He was particularly concerned that, as with 
Quilloin and Lehr, Victoria had an alternative legal father in the form 
of Gerald. Michael was not asserting a parental right over a child who 
would otherwise lack a father; Michael’s claim would displace Gerald 
from the marital family that existed at the time of Michael’s lawsuit.133 
Presented with two alternative families, one where the parents were 
split up and never married to each other, and another where the legal 
father and mother were married and lived together as a unitary family, 
Scalia concluded that “it is not unconstitutional for the State to give 
categorical preference to the latter.”134  
127. Id.  
128. Id. (quoting Cal. Evid. Code § 621(a) (1989)). 
129. Id.  
130. Id. at 119–21. 
131. Id. at 123. 
132. Id. at 125. 
133. Id. at 123–24.  
134. Id. at 129. 
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Justice Brennan dissented, pointing to the Court’s past cases to 
question why such importance was placed on the “only difference” of 
Gerald’s marriage to Carole.135 Justice White, in a separate dissent that 
Justice Brennan joined, asked, “in light of Carole’s vicissitudes, what 
more could Michael have done?”136 White argued that the Court’s 
discussion of the importance of an unwed biological father stepping 
forward to take on the responsibilities of fatherhood could have been 
directed at Michael, who followed their instructions—yet the Court 
nonetheless rejected his constitutional argument.137 
In the eyes of at least slim majorities of the Court, therefore, unwed 
biological fathers have a significantly different constitutional status 
than unwed biological mothers. The unwed-father principles justify 
treating them differently than unwed mothers. Unwed biological 
mothers hold decision-making power over their children from the 
moment of conception and, as a physical and societal matter, are tasked 
with their children’s care. This justifies, according to this line of cases, 
immediately bestowing a fundamental constitutional right upon unwed 
biological mothers. Unwed biological fathers, however, have additional 
requirements before they have any cognizable constitutional interest.138 
They must seek out and assume the responsibilities of fatherhood, 
regardless of circumstances that might make that difficult or impossible. 
They must create a substantial relationship with their child through 
acting like a father, and ideally through acting like a husband, proving 
that they are an exception to the second-stereotype unwed-father 
principle.139 And they must not have become fathers through a 
nontraditional or even illicit relationship, particularly if a “better” legal 
father is willing and able to assume the role of legal father. 
Furthermore, these same differences, embodied in the unwed-father 
principles, justify rejecting almost all equal protection claims brought 
by unwed fathers. The perceived differently situated unwed father is 
justifiably treated differently under statutory law and by the 
Constitution. 
The Court’s treatment of the parentage claims of unwed biological 
fathers clearly reflects gendered stereotypes regarding fathers versus 
 
135. Id. at 143–44 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
136. Id. at 160 (White, J., dissenting). 
137. Id. at 163. 
138. But see Jennifer Hendricks, who argues that the additional burden merely 
equalizes the burden that a birth mother takes on in the form of pregnancy 
and birth, requiring men to exhibit “parental behavior that is fairly basic, 
yet appropriate to the facts of men’s biology.” Jennifer S. Hendricks, 
Essentially A Mother, 13 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 429, 444 (2007). 
139. Melissa Murray, What’s So New About the New Illegitimacy?, 20 Am. U. 
J. Gender Soc. Pol’y & L. 387, 409 (2012). 
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mothers. As Karen Czapanskiy famously put it, mothers are “draftees,” 
whose parental status and responsibility is assumed, whereas fathers 
are volunteers who only sign up at will.140 The flip side of parentage as 
volunteerism, however, is that not all volunteers are welcome. Mothers 
are viewed as natural, nurturing parents, whereas fathers lack innate 
parenting skills.141 
As I have previously written: 
[Unwed biological fathers’ rights are] fundamentally relational, 
turning either on his relationship with the biological mother or 
with the child. The only way for a man to ensure parental rights 
before birth is to marry the biological mother, a marriage-based 
classification that the Supreme Court has explicitly held raises no 
equal protection concerns. And the only way for an unwed man 
to ensure parental rights after birth is to create a functional 
relationship with the child, which is dependent on the biological 
mother’s willingness to allow such a bond to develop.142 
The Court is skeptical of unwed biological fathers both as partners 
(or as failed spouses) and as fathers, citing stereotypical views of 
masculinity and describing men as eager to evade parental 
responsibilities.143 As discussed above, states have liberalized their 
statutes such that it would be much easier for men in the position of 
these appellants to be recognized as legal fathers. The constitutional 
doctrine, however, remains approving of the starkly differential 
treatment of mothers and fathers. 
One reading of the different approach taken by statutes and 
constitutional analysis is that state legislatures have secured the rights 
of fathers such that the constitutional doctrine is mooted. In the most 
superficial analysis of dispositions, this is correct, for example, 
California amended its marital presumption statute following Michael  
140. Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees: The Struggle for Parental 
Equality, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1415, 1415–16 (1991); see also Nancy E. 
Dowd, Fathers and the Supreme Court: Founding Fathers and Nurturing 
Fathers, 54 Emory L.J. 1271 (2005). 
141. Linda Kelly, The Alienation of Fathers, 6 Mich. J. Race & L. 181, 184 
(2000). 
142. Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights: Labor, Intent, and 
Fathers, 41 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 645, 679 (2014); see also Murray, supra 
note 139, at 409 (describing the Court as “anchored by a persistent 
skepticism of non-marriage (and all of its consequences) and a persistent 
veneration of marriage as the normative ideal for adult intimate life”). 
143. Nancy Dowd has written extensively about how masculinities affect men 
as fathers, pressuring them to see nurturing and emotional caregiving as 
female (and thus unacceptable) characteristics. See, e.g., Nancy E. Dowd, 
Masculinities and Feminist Legal Theory, 23 Wis. J.L. Gender & Soc’y 
201, 239 (2008). 
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H. so that a man in Michael’s position would be able to introduce a 
blood test showing biological fatherhood as evidence to support a 
petition to establish his paternity.144 
The constitutional analysis of parental rights incorporating the 
unwed-father principles, however, reverberates through different areas 
of the law, meaning that cases typically categorized as solely family law 
cases impact the analysis of issues far outside the bounds of family law. 
In this reading, the Supreme Court’s unaddressed history of parentage 
cases in the 1970s and 1980s bolsters the constitutionality of gendered 
statutes today, as states can point to constitutional analysis in the 
context of family law to apply in the context of other areas. Crucially, 
this exporting of family law doctrine is more likely applied to the equal 
protection side of the cases, as a more attenuated link between 
parentage and a legal right makes the fundamental right claim remote. 
The next Part provides examples of the impact of family law 
constitutionalism, where gendered identification of unwed parents helps 
to determine the result in immigration, inheritance, and beyond. 
II. Gendered Parenthood in Other Areas of Law 
There are scores of contexts outside of family law where the 
identification of family members plays an important role. Tax law 
involves defining familial dependents, application of the marital 
privilege in criminal law necessitates recognizing spouses, and some tort 
claims may be brought only by certain family members. 
In some contexts, the gendered classification of unwed parents in 
family law has been imported—and more significantly, so has the 
constitutional analysis of challenges to that gendered treatment of 
parents. This Part discusses two of the most explicit examples of how 
family law’s dismissal of the constitutional rights of unwed fathers has 
been underscored in challenges to statutes well outside the ambit of 
family law: immigration law, in the context of the transmission of 
citizenship, and inheritance law, in the context of children inheriting 
from unwed intestate parents. 
A.  Immigration Law: Transmission of Citizenship 
At its root, immigration law regulates the movement of people. 
Because people often move with their families, regulating the movement 
of people also implicitly regulates families. The gendered stereotypes 
 
144. See Michael L. Oddenino, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: A Critical 
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regarding fathers and mothers are built into federal immigration law 
from the ground up.145 
Transmission of citizenship is one such area in which family law’s 
gender stereotypes find an additional and more recent voice.146 
American citizenship via birth can be acquired through two different 
theories: jus soli, known as birthright citizenship, is the grant of 
American citizenship to any person born on American land,147 whereas, 
jus sanguinis is the grant of citizenship through the citizenship of a 
child’s parents.148 This parent-dependent citizenship, however, has two 
important aspects when considering the echoes of family law’s gendered 
parental stereotypes. The first is that recognition as a parent for 
purposes of transmitting citizenship can be different than recognition 
as a parent under state-level family law.149 The second notable aspect 
is that parent-dependent citizenship is explicitly gendered, as 
transmission of citizenship depends on whether the American-
citizenship parent is a mother or a father.150 
Although jus sanguinis citizenship has always depended on the 
gender of the American-citizen parent, which parent can more easily 
transmit citizenship has shifted over time in a way that demonstrates 
how directly dominant gender stereotypes of a given time period are 
incorporated into the law. Initially, in keeping with patriarchal 
traditions, only fathers could transmit American citizenship to their 
 
145. For examples of commentary upon the gendered aspects of family law and 
immigration law, see Kerry Abrams & R. Kent Piacenti, Immigration’s 
Family Values, 100 Va. L. Rev. 629 (2014); Albertina Antognini, From 
Citizenship to Custody: Unwed Fathers Abroad and at Home, 36 Harv. 
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Comment, Conflating Women’s Biological and Sociological Roles: The 
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Nguyen v. INS Opinion, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 803 (2003). 
146. See Kristin A. Collins, A Short History of Sex and Citizenship: The 
Historians’ Amicus Brief in Flores-Villar v. United States, 91 B.U. L. 
Rev. 1485, 1489 (2011) (“An important goal of the historians’ amicus 
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Images, 51 Hastings L.J. 557, 565 (2000). 
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children.151 Under coverture, women and children’s legal personhood 
was subsumed within their husband or father’s, meaning that his 
citizenship status became their own.152 
After family law began to reject some of the principles of coverture 
and exalt a domestic role for women as natural caregivers, immigration 
law followed by tying children’s citizenship status to their mother 
instead of their father.153 Today, it is the mother who can more easily 
transmit citizenship, not the father. 
In identifying who is eligible to transmit citizenship, federal statutes 
have recognized the relationship between an unmarried mother and 
child much earlier and much easier than the relationship between an 
unmarried father and child. The Supreme Court has evaluated such 
distinctions in several cases over the past few decades, and in all but 
one has held that the challenged statutes do not violate the 
Constitution. Moreover, the Court repeatedly echoes the same 
arguments that appeared in family law’s constitutional doctrine: 
mothers and fathers are differently situated with regard to identification 
of their genetic relationship and how likely each parent is to have an 
emotional relationship with their child. 
One of the earliest cases arose in the 1970s, alongside the family 
law cases discussed above. The case, Fiallo v. Bell,154 did not directly 
address citizenship transmission, but the immigration status of close 
family members of American citizens and lawful permanent residents. 
The case was brought by three sets of unmarried biological fathers and 
their children, challenging portions of the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952 that defined “child.”155 The child of an American citizen or 
lawful permanent resident would receive preferred status for 
immigration purposes, but as the Court noted, “child” was defined very 
specifically: “an unmarried person under 21 years of age who is a 
legitimate or legitimated child, a stepchild, an adopted child, or an 
illegitimate child seeking preference by virtue of his relationship with 
his natural mother.”156 An illegitimate child thus had no way of seeking 
preference through his or her father. Similarly, the parents of an 
American citizen or lawful permanent resident would receive 
preferential status, but parents were identified using the same definition  
151. See Rachel K. Alexander, Case Note, Nguyen v. INS: The Supreme Court 
Rationalizes Gender-Based Distinctions in Upholding an Equal Protection 
Challenge, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 789, 802 (2002); Kelly, supra note 147, 
at 565. 
152. Kelly, supra note 147, at 561. 
153. See id. at 562, 568–71.  
154. 430 U.S. 787 (1977).  
155. Id. at 788, 790. 
156. Id. at 788. 
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of “child.”157 The relationship between unwed biological fathers and 
their illegitimate children, therefore, was not recognized for purposes of 
immigration where an unwed biological mother’s relationship with her 
illegitimate child was. 
The plaintiffs argued that this refusal to recognize the parent-child 
relationship between unwed fathers and children deprived them of equal 
protection, due process, and association under the First, Fifth, and 
Ninth Amendments.158 The Supreme Court rejected all of these 
arguments,159 and instead explained that the policy judgments 
embodied in the immigration statutes were “entrusted exclusively to 
the political branches of our Government, and we have no judicial 
authority to substitute our political judgment for that of the 
Congress.”160 The Court speculated that “perhaps” Congress declined 
to grant preferential status to the relationship between child and unwed 
biological father for two familiar reasons repeated in the unwed-father 
principles: the “serious problems of proof that usually lurk in paternity 
determinations” and “a perceived absence in most cases of close family 
ties” between unwed biological fathers and their children.161 
The Court’s opinion did not offer significant analysis of the 
gendered natures of these presumed justifications, although since the 
decision was issued in 1977, it was written before almost all of the cases 
that developed the current doctrine applying heightened scrutiny to 
classifications based on sex.162 Even before a robust history of cases 
discussing gender and equal protection, however, Justice Marshall’s 
dissent clearly identified the gendered dimension to the statute as 
problematic. He noted that the class of people denied the preferential 
status was “defined on the basis of two traditionally disfavored 
classifications—gender and legitimacy.”163 Justice Marshall also pointed 
out a bizarre consequence to the inclusion of step-parent relationships: 
an unmarried biological father could never be recognized as a parent 
under the statute, but if he later married, his wife could qualify for the 
preferential treatment as a step-parent.164 
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It was not until two decades later that the Court next addressed a 
challenge to gendered immigration laws in Miller v. Albright.165 The case 
arose out of transmission of citizenship: Lorelyn Peñero Miller was born 
in June 1970 in the Philippines to unmarried parents.166 Her mother was 
Filipino and her father was American.167 Her father filed a petition in 
1992 that resulted in a Voluntary Paternity Decree, establishing that 
he was her father.168 Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 
however, because he established his paternity after she turned eighteen 
years old, she was ineligible to receive American citizenship transmitted 
through her parentage.169 Had the citizenship of her parents been 
switched, such that her mother was the American citizen, the mother’s 
American citizenship would have been transmitted to Miller at birth 
without any need to take further steps to establish the mother/child 
link.170 Miller argued that the differential requirements for fathers and 
mothers violated the Fifth Amendment.171 
The Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, rejected Miller’s 
argument.172 The Court acknowledged that the transmission of 
citizenship operated differently depending on the gender of the 
American-citizen parent, requiring only children born to unmarried 
citizen fathers to formally establish paternity before they reached the 
age of eighteen.173 These differences, however, were “well supported by 
valid governmental interests,” in the eyes of the plurality.174 The 
differences are by now very familiar and precisely track the unwed-
father principles laid out in the family law cases. First, it was an 
important governmental objective to ensure that the child seeking 
citizenship was in fact biologically related to an American citizen.175 In 
support of this proposition, the Court cited Fiallo v. Bell and Trimble 
v. Gordon,176 an inheritance case.177 If the child sought to show a  
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166. Id. at 424–25. 
167. Id. at 425. 
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biological relationship to his or her mother, that was easy enough, as 
the relationship to the birth mother was “immediately obvious.”178 By 
contrast, the asserted relationship to the unmarried biological father 
was unproven and could not be demonstrated through any other 
contemporaneous public records.179 The requirement that the father 
formally establish his paternity, therefore, merely established the 
existence of an otherwise unproven claim to biological relationships.180 
A biological relationship, however, could obviously be proven after 
the child reached the age of eighteen. The second justification for the 
law addressed the perceived need to establish the relationship while the 
child was still a minor: “the interest in encouraging the development of 
a healthy relationship between the citizen parent and the child while 
the child is a minor; and the related interest in fostering ties between 
the foreign-born child and the United States.”181 In other words, 
transmission of citizenship should take place where the American-
citizen parent has at least an opportunity to develop a relationship with 
his or her child that would also transmit American culture and 
American values. 
It is here that the Court relies most on gendered stereotypes about 
parenting. The opportunity to create a meaningful relationship, in the 
Court’s eyes, is very different depending upon the gender of the parent: 
When a child is born out of wedlock outside of the United States, 
the citizen mother, unlike the citizen father, certainly knows of 
her child’s existence and typically will have custody of the child 
immediately after the birth. Such a child thus has the opportunity 
to develop ties with its citizen mother at an early age, and may 
even grow up in the United States if the mother returns. By 
contrast, due to the normal interval of nine months between 
conception and birth, the unmarried father may not even know 
that his child exists, and the child may not know the father’s 
identity.182 
Congress, in the Court’s eyes, acted upon this gendered prediction 
of the likelihood that fathers versus mothers would have the 
opportunity to develop a relationship with their child. Congress 
assumed that mothers have a relationship with children to whom they 
give birth. Congress was not willing to extend any such assumption to 
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fathers, and so placed an additional requirement upon them to show 
that they acknowledged their child while the child was still a minor.183 
Notably, the Court explicitly relied upon its family law precedent 
to conclude the additional burden placed upon unwed fathers was 
constitutional, arguing that its logic was “directly supported” by Lehr 
v. Robertson.184 The Court analogized unwed fathers attempting to 
transmit citizenship to their biological children to unwed fathers 
attempting to establish a legal relationship to their child under 
domestic family law, setting Miller’s father alongside the father in 
Lehr.185 The Court compared the burden upon both fathers, and found 
the argument that Miller’s father faced an impermissibly higher 
gendered burden “even less persuasive.”186 The father in Lehr was 
deprived of his status as legal parent because he was unable to establish 
his parenthood within about two years of the child’s birth, whereas the 
father in Miller had eighteen years to do so.187  
As in Lehr, the Court denied that the INA requirements rested 
upon gender or gender stereotypes. The Court noted that transmission 
of citizenship was regulated by more questions and requirements than 
the gender of the American-citizen parent alone,188 and further denied 
that it was the gender of the parent that actually mattered for purposes 
of citizenship. The Court asserted that it was not “merely the sex of 
the citizen parent,” but “an event creating a legal relationship between 
parent and child” that determined eligibility for citizenship: the birth 
alone for mothers, and post-birth establishment of paternity for 
fathers.189 These differential requirements were justified by biological 
differences, the Court argued, and not gender stereotypes.190 
The Justices writing in dissent obviously disagreed, both objecting 
to the Court’s reliance on gender stereotypes. Justice Ginsburg noted 
that although the different requirements might be viewed as “a benign 
preference, an affirmative action of sorts,”191 the differences were clearly 
“based on generalizations (stereotypes) about the way women (or men) 
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are.”192 Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the mere language of the 
Court’s opinion demonstrated this, as it “constantly relates and relies 
on what ‘typically,’ or ‘normally,’ or ‘probably’ happens ‘often.’”193 
Justice Breyer’s dissent argued that the INA’s distinctions between 
mothers and fathers “depend for their validity upon the generalization 
that mothers are significantly more likely than fathers to care for their 
children, or to develop caring relationships with their children.”194 In 
Justice Ginsburg’s view, Congress could have achieved its purpose of 
“assuring close ties to the United States” without using gender as a 
classification method, and the plurality opinion did not explain why 
such “reliance on gender distinctions” was appropriate rather than 
gender-neutral methods.195 
Before reaching the Supreme Court, the D.C. Circuit came to the 
same conclusion as the Supreme Court’s plurality and drew similar 
disagreement from other members of the bench. Judge Wald wrote a 
separate concurrence196 arguing that “there is a world of difference 
between noting that men and women often fill different roles in society 
and using these different roles as the justification for imposing inflexible 
legal restrictions on one sex and not the other.”197 In logic later echoed 
by Justice Ginsburg, Judge Wald did not object to any requirement 
that an American-citizen parent establish their parentage before the 
child turned eighteen years old, only to applying a one-gender 
requirement that “clearly derive[d] from the stereotyping assumption 
that mothers automatically will be close to their illegitimate children 
whereas fathers will not.”198 
Three years later, the Supreme Court heard a second challenge to 
the same gendered distinction, revisiting the question in the wake of 
even more appellate courts disagreeing as to whether the distinction 
was impermissibly reliant on gendered stereotypes.199 Again, the case 
was brought by the child of an American-citizen father and a noncitizen 
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mother, born outside of the United States.200 Tuan Anh Nguyen was 
born in Vietnam to his Vietnamese mother, but moved to Texas when 
he was five years old and was subsequently raised in America by his 
American-citizen father.201 Although Nguyen became a lawful 
permanent resident, his father did not legally establish his parentage 
under the INA until Nguyen was twenty-eight years old, after 
deportation proceedings had begun to remove Nguyen to Vietnam.202 In 
contrast to Lorena Penero Miller, who lived in the Philippines until she 
was at least twenty-one years old,203 Nguyen thus spent the vast 
majority of his childhood years living with his American-citizen parent 
in the United States. 
Because Nguyen’s father had not established his parenthood before 
Nguyen’s eighteenth birthday, however, he was deemed ineligible for 
transmission of citizenship through his father. Justice Kennedy, writing 
for a majority of the Court, held that the different statutory 
requirements for transmitting the citizenships of unwed mothers versus 
unwed fathers did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of 
equal protection.204 The Court again justified the gendered requirements 
with the two familiar interests paralleling the unwed-father principles: 
ensuring that a biological relationship existed between the American-
citizen parent and the child, and ensuring an opportunity for the 
American-citizen parent and child to create a relationship.205 
Again, the Court declared that birth itself inherently demonstrated 
a biological connection between mother and child.206 By contrast, the 
Court cited Lehr (itself quoting Caban) to support the proposition that 
the father might not be present at the birth, and even if he was, his 
physical presence did not demonstrate a biological connection to the 
child.207 Justice Kennedy argued that fathers and mothers “are not 
similarly situated with regard to the proof of biological parenthood,” 
and thus the additional requirement placed upon fathers “is neither 
surprising nor troublesome from a constitutional perspective.”208 To do 
otherwise “would be to insist on a hollow neutrality.”209 
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Similarly, the Court reiterated Miller’s focus on the opportunity for 
a relationship between American-citizen parent and child to develop 
and transmit “the real, everyday ties that provide a connection between 
child and citizen parent and, in turn, the United States.”210 Justice 
Kennedy focused on the mother’s “initial point of contact” with the 
child at the time of birth, an opportunity that the father did not 
necessarily have.211 Indeed, Justice Kennedy argued, there is no 
guarantee that father and child would ever meet at all.212 
Both Justices Kennedy and Stevens had a particular type of 
American-citizen father in mind helping to animate this concern: U.S. 
servicemembers stationed abroad. In Miller, Justice Stevens wrote that 
Congress may have been motivated in part by concern “about a class 
of children born abroad out of wedlock to alien mothers and to 
American servicemen who would not necessarily know about, or be 
known by, their children.”213 Justice Kennedy reiterated this population 
in Nguyen, mentioning the “particular significance” of “young people, 
men for the most part, who are on duty with the Armed Forces in 
foreign countries.”214 
Justice O’Connor dissented in Nguyen, and argued explicitly that 
the majority opinion rested upon the same type of gendered stereotypes 
that had been found unconstitutional in other contexts.215 Justice 
O’Connor focused upon the importance Justice Kennedy placed on the 
opportunity for an American-citizen parent and child to develop a 
relationship rather than an actual relationship, as existed between 
Nguyen and his father.216 Justice O’Connor pointed out the obvious, 
that living in the United States and being raised by his American-
citizen parent since the age of five certainly created the relationship 
that the majority opinion believed was Congress’s goal.217 This was not 
important simply as a dramatic point regarding the family in question: 
Justice O’Connor pointed out that “because we require a much tighter 
fit between means and ends under heightened scrutiny, the availability 
of sex-neutral alternatives to a sex-based classification is often highly 
probative of the validity of the classification.”218 She argued that it was 
“difficult to see how” focusing upon an opportunity to create a  
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relationship and establishing that opportunity before the child’s 
eighteenth birthday was significant for Congress’s alleged purposes 
rather than showing that a parent-child relationship actually existed.219 
Further, this focus on the opportunity to develop a relationship, rather 
than a developed relationship itself, “would appear to rest only on an 
overbroad sex-based generalization”220: 
A mother may not have an opportunity for a relationship if the 
child is removed from his or her mother on account of alleged 
abuse or neglect, or if the child and mother are separated by 
tragedy, such as disaster or war, of the sort apparently present in 
this case. There is no reason, other than stereotype, to say that 
fathers who are present at birth lack an opportunity for a 
relationship on similar terms.221 
Significantly, Justice O’Connor acknowledged that the descriptions 
in both Miller and Nguyen of what was typical or probable might be 
accurate as a descriptive matter yet still violate the Constitution.222 The 
question, in O’Connor’s analysis, was not the accuracy of a stereotype, 
or whether the stereotype demeaned the group it was applied to, but 
whether the stereotype used gender as a proxy for “more germane bases 
of classification.”223 If the goal of citizenship transmission was to grant 
citizenship only to children who had a relationship with the American-
citizen parent that could transmit American culture and values, then 
courts should ask whether that relationship existed, rather than rely 
upon generalities and stereotypes about which gender of parent was 
more likely to create such a relationship.224 
Justice Kennedy rejected such a summary, arguing that to do so 
would “fail to acknowledge even our most basic biological differences—
such as the fact that a mother must be present at birth but the father 
need not be.”225 He believed that “[t]he distinction embodied in the 
statutory scheme here at issue is not marked by misconception and 
prejudice, nor does it show disrespect for either class,” and thus did not 
violate equal protection.226 
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Multiple lessons can be drawn from this line of cases. First, it is 
worth noting that the Court’s review of immigration statutes, including 
the transmission of citizenship, is complicated by the plenary power 
doctrine, instructing that the Court defer to Congress when it regulates 
immigration.227 The Supreme Court in Fiallo v. Bell “emphasized that 
‘over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more 
complete than it is over’ the admission of aliens.”228 One of the reasons 
that the Miller opinion only drew the support of a plurality of the Court 
was that Justices disagreed about whether the topic was justiciable at 
all.229 Although the Nguyen Court drew a majority of Justices,230 the 
legacy of judicial deference in the area of immigration law is strong, if 
not controlling. 
With that said, however, it is striking that the Court’s logic rarely 
relies upon the plenary power or otherwise refuses to engage with 
substantive challenges to immigration laws in favor of simply deferring 
to Congress. Instead, the Court grapples with the questions at hand, 
imports the unwed-father principles from its family law doctrine, and 
often relies upon those cases explicitly. 
This reliance upon family law doctrine and reasoning appears in 
modern cases despite the fact that societal and medical changes since 
the 1970s and 1980s weaken the assumptions upon which the Court’s 
logic rests. As Kerry Abrams and R. Kent Piacenti have pointed out, 
the INA focuses on the “outdated and pernicious” reliance on “the 
indelibility of blood” rather than functional relationships between 
parents and children as the means of transmitting citizenship.231 
Because of this, “the INA creates a perverse system in which children 
of fathers who have been sued for child support are more likely to be 
U.S. citizens than children of fathers who voluntarily care for and 
support them.”232 Similarly, as discussed further below, the proxy of 
gender for biological or genetic relationship is no longer accurate given 
advances in medical technology, particularly international surrogacy 
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and fertility tourism.233 The factual assumptions of the Court’s family 
law doctrine are by now outdated, yet the Court continues to rely upon 
them. Were the Court to acknowledge these changes, the repeated 
criticism in multiple dissents that the Court is using gender as a proxy 
for another fact would be even stronger. 
Finally, it is difficult to agree with the majority opinions that the 
Court does not rely upon gendered stereotypes in immigration cases 
imported from family law.234 The Court’s opinions repeatedly discuss 
the perception that mothers are much more likely to be responsible for 
their children, as opposed to absentee unwed fathers who may not even 
be present at the birth. The Court even repeatedly cites the trope of 
the American soldier having a sexual relationship with a local woman 
while stationed abroad, then abandoning her and his child to return to 
America.235 
It is worth noting, moreover, that it is not simply gender 
stereotypes that are embodied in immigration law. Kristin Collins has 
uncovered a deeply racist dimension to the law of transmitting 
citizenship that used gendered transmission to embody racial 
preferences and stereotypes as well.236 As mentioned above, initially only 
men were able to transmit American citizenship to their children, a 
process consonant with coverture’s assumption that a husband was the 
legal representation of both himself and the rest of his family.237 (Indeed, 
historically American-citizen women could lose their citizenship if they 
married a noncitizen.238) As women gained some legal independence 
and, more importantly, as responsibility for unmarried children shifted 
to women, laws were changed to allow American mothers to similarly 
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transmit citizenship.239 As Congress adjusted which parents could 
transmit citizenship, however, the differential treatment of the children 
of American soldiers illustrates Collins’s point: 
The disparate treatment of nonwhite children of servicemen 
renders the Court’s formulation especially troubling. Congress 
and the military marshaled extraordinary political and material 
resources in order to bring the non-Asian brides and babies of 
World War II soldiers home to the United States. Meanwhile, 
military policies that prohibited and limited interracial marriage 
between U.S. soldiers stationed in Asia and local women 
frustrated the efforts of those servicemen who sought recognition 
of, and American citizenship for, their children. This sorry history 
calls into question the suggestion that a father’s lack of an 
opportunity to bond with his child at birth can reasonably be 
understood as a “biological inevitability.” Instead, it reveals the 
limitation of citizenship transmission between the American 
father and his nonmarital foreign-born child as the product of 
choices of officials charged with enforcing and developing the rules 
that governed membership in the polity—rules that were 
constructed and construed in ways that tended to exclude 
nonwhite children from citizenship.240 
The tropes upon which the modern Court relies thus embody a 
legacy of stereotype and prejudice. The Court’s opinions largely reject 
criticism that they rely on gender stereotypes by taking issue with what 
a gender stereotype is, arguing that stereotypes that are mostly 
accurate based upon perceived biological difference and do not explicitly 
demean one gender are constitutionally acceptable. The accuracy and 
neutrality of these claims are debatable, of course. But it is clear that 
the claims are fundamentally the same as the arguments first presented 
in the Court’s family law cases. 
The Court’s analysis of issues arising out of transmission of 
citizenship is only one example of the impact of the Court’s family law 
doctrine. The next section turns to another, in the context of 
inheritance. 
B. Inheritance Law: Intestate Inheritance of Nonmarital Children 
Inheritance law is a natural fit for some doctrinal crossover from 
family law. The most familiar form of inheritance is from parent to 
child, so establishing the link between parent and child is a central 
question in many inheritance issues,241 and the influence from family 
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law in assessing who is a parent (and how parentage is proven) is 
significant.242 
As in family law and immigration law, a thorny issue for inheritance 
law has been the different treatment of legitimate and illegitimate 
children. Historically, having children outside of marriage was viewed 
as morally wrong, and the law reflected this condemnation by treating 
illegitimate children fundamentally differently than children of married 
parents.243 The first question was thus whether any parent-child 
relationship between an unwed parent and his or her child would be 
recognized in any area of law. As American society evolved to be more 
accepting of the increasing number of children born to unmarried 
parents,244 scholars such as Harry Krause argued (with considerable 
success) that the legal stigma of illegitimacy should be lessened.245 
The earliest such cases did not arise in family law or inheritance 
law, but in tort. The earliest cases challenging the legal stigma of 
illegitimacy to be heard before the Supreme Court largely arose in the 
context of rights between illegitimate children and their mothers.246 A 
series of cases, for example, dealt with whether nonmarital children 
could sue for the wrongful death of one of their parents, or whether 
statutes permitting only marital children to bring such claims were 
constitutional.247 Beginning in the late 1960s, the Supreme Court found  
(2008). But see Laura A. Rosenbury, Federal Visions of Private Family 
Support, 67 Vand. L. Rev. 1835 (2014) (arguing that federal agencies 
and courts impose federal definitions of family upon states in order to 
privatize family dependency). 
242. For example, after the Supreme Court established that the fundamental 
right to marry encompassed same-sex spouses in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 
S. Ct. 2584, 2604–05 (2015), the question was immediately posed whether 
the family law concept of the marital presumption would apply in the 
context of inheritance. See Paula A. Monopoli, Inheritance Law and the 
Marital Presumption After Obergefell, 8 Est. Plan. & Community 
Prop. L.J. 437 (2016). 
243. See Susan Frelich Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 Am. 
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245. See, e.g., Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 Mich. 
L. Rev. 477 (1967). 
246. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70–72 (1968) (holding that 
Louisiana law barring illegitimate child from suing for the wrongful death 
of her mother was unconstitutional); Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. 
Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75–76 (1968) (holding that Louisiana statute barring 
mother from suing for the wrongful death of her illegitimate daughter was 
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illegitimate children violated Equal Protection Clause); Weber v. Aetna 
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a series of such statutes unconstitutional, explaining that it was 
“illogical and unjust” to effectively punish children for the perceived 
immorality of their parents.248 
Even after the starkest refusals to recognize the parent-child links 
if the parent was unmarried at the time of the child’s birth were ended, 
the gendered dimensions of unwed parenthood continued to influence 
questions of inheritance. In other words, one major step was simply to 
say that nonmarital children should not be universally barred from 
benefits and rights that marital children held, such as the ability to 
bring a wrongful death suit upon the death of a parent. Once that line 
was crossed, and the relationship between illegitimate child and parent 
could be recognized, the obvious next question was who could be 
identified as a nonmarital child’s parent (and how). 
As is now familiar, nonmarital mothers were immediately identified 
as a legal parent, whereas unmarried fathers were not. Continuing to 
trace wrongful death claims, for example, the differential treatment has 
continued. Even relatively recently children have been barred from 
bringing wrongful death claims if the nonmarital father had not met 
certain burdens during his lifetime, such as publicly acknowledging his 
paternity.249 Reversing the factual basis of the claim, nonmarital fathers 
are also often barred from bringing a wrongful death claim arising from 
their child’s death if the father has not established his paternity under 
state law, such as by creating a relationship with the child.250 
An even clearer example, however, occurs in the context of 
inheritance law asking when a nonmarital child may inherit from her 
parent if the parent did not have a will when he or she died. One aspect 
of statutes that have been repeatedly challenged is the same as in the 
context of family law and immigration law: whether imposing different 
burdens of proof of parentage upon fathers and mothers violates the 
Constitution. 
 
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972) (holding that Louisiana statute 
barring unacknowledged illegitimate children from recovering under 
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A second issue, however, is unique to inheritance law and 
introduces additional dimensions of gendered stereotypes. One of the 
principles of intestacy is to distribute the estate in the way that the 
deceased person would have wanted. Statutes establishing who can 
inherit from an intestate person, therefore, are a legislature’s perception 
of the testator’s intent as to such categories of people.251 
As a general rule, children born to unmarried mothers inherit if the 
mother dies intestate—yet states impose additional requirements as to 
an unmarried father’s actions during life to acknowledge or support his 
child before such a child may inherit if the father dies intestate.252 Part 
of the justification for such additional requirements is to establish the 
nonmarital father’s paternity, but another part is that such fathers 
would not want their children to inherit, logic that plays into the 
second-stereotype unwed-father principle’s perception of unwed fathers 
as uncommitted unless proven otherwise. 
What evidence is sufficient to prove paternity for the purpose of 
inheritance varies state by state. Some focus upon a prior legal 
recognition of paternity, such as adjudications of paternity or formal 
acknowledgments of paternity in something like a court filing.253 Such 
adjudications sometimes, but not always, include agreements to provide 
child support.254 A common requirement to establish nonmarital 
paternity is that the father publicly recognized the child as his own 
during the father’s lifetime,255 sometimes that the father acknowledged 
the child and did not refuse to support the child.256 
The Supreme Court heard a handful of cases challenging such 
statutes under the Equal Protection Clause beginning in the late 
1970s.257 The cases are complicated as they simultaneously raise two 
potential equal protection concerns: one is the differential treatment of 
a child’s relationship with unwed mothers versus fathers, but in 
addition, children of unmarried parents are subject to different 
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inheritance requirements than the children of married parents.258 Both 
classifications on the basis of sex and on the basis of legitimacy trigger 
heightened scrutiny under the Constitution, but the evaluation of what 
goal the state is pursuing and how related the classification is to that 
goal can vary considerably depending on whether the claim is framed 
as legitimacy or gender.259 Regardless of the overlapping claims, the 
inheritance challenges echo the very same unwed-father principles 
discussed above: a concern for the proof of a biological relationship and 
the existence of a parent-child relationship. The second concern is 
magnified in the context of inheritance law by speculating as to the 
unwed father’s intention for his child in a way that demonstrates the 
power of the stereotype of unengaged, uninvolved unmarried fathers. 
The first case arose when a man named Sherman Gordon was 
murdered.260 At the time of his death, Gordon had been living with 
Jessie Trimble for four years, along with their daughter Deta Mona 
Trimble.261 Gordon acknowledged Deta as his daughter and was in 
compliance with a child support order and an accompanying paternity 
order concerning Deta.262 
Had Gordon and Trimble been married, Gordon’s estate would 
have passed to Deta.263 Because the two were unmarried, however, Deta 
could not inherit: under Illinois law, illegitimate children inherited only 
from intestate mothers, not their fathers.264 Deta argued that this 
distinction violated the Equal Protection Clause as unconstitutional 
classifications both on the basis of legitimacy and sex.265 
The relevant provisions of the Illinois Probate Act had been 
challenged before in Illinois courts, and the state had previously 
explained the gender distinction by the fact that it was easy to establish 
maternity through the fact of birth, as compared to a more difficult and 
burdensome process of proving paternity.266 Additionally, the Illinois 
Supreme Court had reasoned that the probate statute did not prevent 
nonmarital children from inheriting, as they would inherit so long as 
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their father wrote a will.267 Any inability to inherit was therefore due to 
the father’s choices, and not the state’s actions. 
The Supreme Court struck down the Illinois law, primarily on the 
basis that it imposed an unconstitutionally unequal burden on 
illegitimate children who were effectively barred from inheriting from 
an intestate father.268 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, also noted 
Illinois’s argument regarding the intent of unwed fathers: 
[A]ppellees urge us to affirm the decision below on the theory that 
the Illinois Probate Act . . . mirrors the presumed intentions of 
the citizens of the State regarding the disposition of their property 
at death. Individualizing this theory, appellees argue that we 
must assume that Sherman Gordon knew the disposition of his 
estate under the Illinois Probate Act and that his failure to make 
a will shows his approval of that disposition.269 
The position of the state of Illinois was therefore that a man who 
had lived with his child and helped raise her from her birth until his 
death, who had been officially adjudicated as her father and was 
meeting his child support obligation, who acknowledged her as his 
daughter publicly, nonetheless indicated through his failure to write a 
will that he intended to disinherit that same child.270 The Court said it 
need not resolve whether such a presumed intent could justify 
discrimination against illegitimate children, as such an intent was not 
actually the goal of the Probate Act, but did not criticize the underlying 
assumption.271 
One year later, another intestate inheritance case came before the 
court in Lalli v. Lalli.272 The case was brought by Robert and Maureen 
Lalli, who claimed that they were the illegitimate children of Mario 
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Lalli and an unnamed woman.273 Their mother had died in 1968, and 
Mario Lalli died intestate in 1973.274 Mario’s widow Rosamond was the 
executor of the estate and opposed their claims.275 
Under New York law, an illegitimate child was deemed “the 
legitimate child of his father so that he and his issue inherit from his 
father” if a court adjudicated the paternity of the father during the 
pregnancy or within two years’ of the child’s birth.276 No such 
adjudication took place during Mario’s lifetime, although Mario 
apparently acknowledged that Robert and Maureen were his children, 
including referring to Robert as “my son” in a notarized affidavit.277 
Because the New York law barred Robert from inheriting, he challenged 
the statute as discrimination against illegitimate children in violation 
of the Equal Protection Clause.278 
Justice Powell again wrote for the Court to uphold New York’s law. 
He argued that the New York law could be distinguished from the 
unconstitutional law in Trimble v. Gordon, which was too broad a bar 
against the inheritance of illegitimate children who were thus made 
subject to an “exceptional burden.”279 By contrast, the Court described 
the New York statute as an evidentiary requirement.280 
The evidence required, of course, was a prescribed method of 
establishing paternity, here to ensure that property was fairly and 
efficiently distributed after someone’s death.281 In explaining why the 
additional evidentiary burden was necessary for unwed fathers, Justice 
Powell repeated the familiar explanation of the first unwed-father 
principle: maternity is immediately established, as birth is recorded by 
the state and generally takes place in front of witnesses.282 By contrast, 
an unwed father might not be aware of and might not care about the 
child, “because of the absence of any ties to the mother.”283 Justice 
Powell noted that a father in a similar position as Mario Lalli, who 
willingly acknowledged his illegitimate children, could simply waive any 
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defense to a paternity adjudication or begin the adjudication himself.284 
It was constitutional, in any case, for New York to choose an 
adjudication of paternity as the only method by which paternity could 
be established for the purposes of inheritance. 
Justice Brennan, writing in dissent for the four Justices in minority, 
found this profoundly unrealistic. His dissent began pointing out that 
all of the interested parties in the case agreed that Robert Lalli was in 
fact Mario’s son.285 The only reason Robert would not inherit was 
because Mario, who had acknowledged and supported his son 
throughout his life, had not separately instituted a paternity 
adjudication against himself.286 Brennan pointed out some of the many 
reasons that this expectation was particularly unrealistic for unwed 
fathers who had already acknowledged their children and assumed 
parental responsibilities: 
Social welfare agencies, busy as they are with errant fathers, are 
unlikely to bring paternity proceedings against fathers who 
support their children. Similarly, children who are acknowledged 
and supported by their fathers are unlikely to bring paternity 
proceedings against them. First, they are unlikely to see the need 
for such adversary proceedings. Second, even if aware of the rule 
requiring judicial filiation orders, they are likely to fear provoking 
disharmony by suing their fathers. For the same reasons, mothers 
of such illegitimates are unlikely to bring proceedings against the 
fathers. Finally, fathers who do not even bother to make out wills 
(and thus die intestate) are unlikely to take the time to bring 
formal filiation proceedings. Thus, as a practical matter, by 
requiring judicial filiation orders entered during the lifetime of the 
fathers, the New York statute makes it virtually impossible for 
acknowledged and freely supported illegitimate children to inherit 
intestate.287 
Four members of the Court acknowledged that the children of 
fathers taking precisely the action deemed significant in the context of 
family law—acknowledging their paternity and voluntarily assuming 
roles as active fathers—were those most likely to be harmed by New 
York’s requirement.288 Yet because the statute was cast as an 
evidentiary requirement rather than as an absolute bar, it did not run 
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause. 
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Finally, in 1986 the Court decided Reed v. Campbell,289 which 
largely retread Trimble’s holding. Texas law instituted virtually the 
same requirement as the Illinois statute in Trimble: illegitimate children 
could not inherit from their father unless the father and mother later 
married each other.290 This requirement was plainly unconstitutional 
after Trimble, but the deceased father in Reed died four months before 
Trimble was issued.291 Texas argued that Trimble could not be applied 
retroactively, and thus the child could not inherit. The Supreme Court 
disagreed, as the child’s inheritance claim was filed after Trimble, and 
thus the trial court had the case as precedent when evaluating her claim 
to her intestate father’s estate.292 
The Court’s analysis in challenges to intestate inheritance claims 
brought by nonmarital children generally focuses upon the nonmarital 
element of the child’s claim, that their inheritance right is significantly 
different than it would have been had the parents been married. This 
focus is certainly understandable, particularly since the effect of the 
typical statute is to punish a child for the choices of adults over whom 
the child has absolutely no control.293 But the cases also hold the seeds 
of the unwed-father principles that the family law cases, arising nearly 
contemporaneous with the inheritance cases, developed into a full 
theory justifying differential treatment of unwed fathers and mothers. 
Moreover, because the first-order problem of inheritance cases has to 
do with legitimacy, the Court fails to interrogate the second-order 
problem of gender stereotypes, and instead leaves them as unquestioned 
assumptions. 
The first biological unwed-father principle, that fathers are harder 
to identify than mothers who are present at birth, operated in the 
inheritance cases as justifying an efficient method of property 
distribution.294 This might have been true in the 1970s, but is no longer 
so today—indeed, Paula Monopoli argues that a better intestacy regime 
would be to assume that if the child can prove a genetic link, then the 
child can inherit from that nonmarital parent, and any nonmarital 
parent who does not like that default may write a will.295 
The second-stereotype unwed-father principle, that unwed fathers 
are generally unwilling and unlikely to take on responsibility for their 
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children, motivated Illinois’s argument that intestacy statutes 
excluding nonmarital children are simply expressing the presumed 
intent of the nonmarital fathers. The stricter requirements in Illinois 
and Texas reinforced another dimension of this assumption: the way an 
unmarried father could demonstrate his commitment to his child was 
not through supporting the child or developing a relationship with the 
child, but by marrying the mother.296 
Immigration and inheritance law are hardly the only fields of law 
where gender stereotypes about fathers and mothers motivate gendered 
differences in the law. They are two of the clearest examples, however, 
of how and why the constitutional doctrine accepting such stereotypes 
as unproblematic reverberates throughout the law in ways that make 
that doctrine harmful even as state-level parentage statutes have moved 
beyond it. The next Part explains a methodology and substantive 
principles as to how the doctrine can and should change, through a 
modern reevaluation of the Equal Protection claims. 
III.  Constitutionalizing Fatherhood: Taking Equal 
Protection and Gendered Parenthood Seriously 
The Court’s approval of different treatment of unwed mothers and 
fathers may seem like a relatively narrow field with few real-world 
consequences, but the previous Part has illustrated two examples of 
how the assumptions underlying the Court’s reasoning underlie other 
gendered distinctions in different areas of law. These assumptions 
should be revisited in the context of family law so that a beneficial 
conceptual impact can spread in the same fashion: a firm statement of 
gender-neutral parenting rules will undercut gendered distinctions in 
other fields of law. Parentage statutes should be reevaluated under the 
Equal Protection Clause and found unconstitutional to the extent that 
they treat unwed fathers and mothers differently. 
One justification for revisiting the parentage cases could simply be 
that the assumptions have been proven inaccurate. The unwed-father 
principles are simply obsolete, given changes to modern society and 
medical developments. The first principle, that biological mothers are 
easy to identify at the moment of birth whereas fathers are not, is 
certainly no longer true given the rise of egg donation and surrogacy 
and the much easier process of genetic testing to identify a father. 
Furthermore, the focus upon pregnancy as the moment that a 
biological mother is identified highlights the problem of pregnancy 
exceptionalism. Feminist scholars have roundly criticized the idea that 
some classifications based on sex are justified by benign biological 
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differences and are thus unproblematic.297 For too long, courts have 
treated pregnancy as synonymous with motherhood. This obscures 
adoptive parents, intended parents having children through surrogacy, 
female partners of pregnant women, and fathers as equal parents. The 
idea that the pregnant woman is the first parent, and any others might 
be added through additional rules, is both medically and socially no 
longer tenable. 
The second unwed-father principle, the stereotype that men are 
reluctant to become fathers, is similarly harmful. Over and over the 
Court points to biological differences (pregnancy and the moment of 
birth) to justify stereotypes about fathers as unwilling parents who 
must be pressured or coerced into parenthood, as opposed to mothers 
who are constitutional mothers from the moment they give birth. 
It is not enough, however, to simply revisit the question of unwed 
fathers’ constitutional rights and find that the unwed-father principles 
are less accurate than previous Courts believed.298 In order to treat 
fathers as equal constitutional parents—in order to constitutionalize 
fathers in a way they currently are not—the frame of analysis must be 
the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, recent Supreme Court 
precedent indicates a path as to how to do so. The next Section outlines 
the theory of such a claim. 
A.  How to Constitutionalize Fathers 
The constitutional status of a parent is, if taken in the abstract, a 
fundamental liberty right. Yet, to describe the problem of differential 
recognition of the constitutional status of unwed fathers and mothers 
as purely a fundamental rights question does not address the actual 
harm. Most obviously, unwed biological fathers have not been 
categorically excluded from parentage, so the problem is not a wholesale 
exclusion. Instead, legal parentage as a fundamental right is a bit of a 
catch-22: in order to be identified as a legal parent, a person must have 
a statute identifying them as such. But in order to challenge a state 
action as violating their rights as a parent, or not recognizing their 
rights as a parent, they must be a legal parent. This was the dilemma 
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in which Michael H. found himself, when the Court rejected his 
assertion of a fundamental right: 
Michael contends as a matter of substantive due process that, 
because he has established a parental relationship with Victoria, 
protection of Gerald’s and Carole’s marital union is an insufficient 
state interest to support termination of that relationship. This 
argument is, of course, predicated on the assertion that Michael 
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in his relationship 
with Victoria.299 
Justice Scalia then concluded that because men in Michael’s 
position had not previously been statutorily identified as legal fathers, 
Michael could not plausibly claim a fundamental right as father.300 
Extending a fundamental right to people who have previously not been 
granted that right or status under statutes is an uphill battle, at least 
to those Justices who share Justice Scalia’s view of fundamental rights. 
Equal protection analysis, however, need not focus upon who has 
traditionally held fundamental rights, or even map out all of the 
dimensions of a fundamental right. In Obergefell v. Hodges, Justice 
Kennedy explained that previous cases “inquired about the right . . . in 
its comprehensive sense, asking if there was a sufficient justification for 
excluding the relevant class from the right.”301 Considering the 
importance of legal parentage, is there a sufficient justification for 
treating unwed biological fathers differently than unwed biological 
mothers? 
This question more accurately addresses the harm caused by 
differential treatment of unwed fathers and mothers. Framing gendered 
treatment of parents as an equal protection problem addresses the 
gender stereotypes underlying the family law cases that impact other 
areas such as immigration and inheritance law. If the sole change to 
constitutional analysis is viewed as the fundamental right to the care 
of your children, then the change would echo only in family law. It is 
both more accurate and more effective, therefore, to focus on the equal 
protection claim. 
Obergefell, the 2015 case establishing that the fundamental right to 
marry must be granted to same-sex couples,302 demonstrates both the 
potential problem and the promise of choosing which claim leads when 
both fundamental rights and equal protection issues are implicated. 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion begins by noting the “transcendent 
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importance of marriage,”303 but immediately notes that marriage is 
characterized by both “continuity and change”304 alongside societal 
evolution. Moreover, Justice Kennedy cites not simply changes in the 
legal definition and societal understanding of marriage, but also changes 
in legal and societal treatment of LGBTQ people.305 
Justice Kennedy then turned fully to the right to marry, reading 
past cases describing marriage as a fundamental right to identify 
“essential attributes” of the right.306 He outlined four principles and 
traditions of marriage that form the core of its importance as a 
fundamental right and reasoned that the four principles applied “with 
equal force to same-sex couples.”307 
Denying the fundamental right to marry had inescapable equality 
dimensions in the eyes of the Court: because marriage was such an 
important social institution, refusing to allow same-sex couples to 
marry signaled the inequality of those couples,308 imposing “stigma and 
injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter.”309 Justice Kennedy 
further explained the link between the fundamental right and equality: 
The right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty 
promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from 
that Amendment’s guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. 
The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are 
connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent 
principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal 
protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-
extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the 
meaning and reach of the other. In any particular case one Clause 
may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more 
accurate and comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may 
converge in the identification and definition of the right. This 
interrelation of the two principles furthers our understanding of 
what freedom is and must become.310 
Evolutions in societal understandings, Justice Kennedy argued, 
meant that the Equal Protection Clause could “reveal unjustified 
inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once passed 
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unnoticed and unchallenged.”311 After giving several examples of past 
cases striking down sex-based classifications within marriage, which 
Justice Kennedy described as demonstrating the “interlocking nature of 
these constitutional safeguards,”312 he argued: 
It is now clear that the challenged laws burden the liberty of 
same-sex couples, and it must be further acknowledged that they 
abridge central precepts of equality. Here the marriage laws 
enforced by the respondents are in essence unequal: same-sex 
couples are denied all the benefits afforded to opposite-sex couples 
and are barred from exercising a fundamental right. Especially 
against a long history of disapproval of their relationships, this 
denial to same-sex couples of the right to marry works a grave 
and continuing harm. The imposition of this disability on gays 
and lesbians serves to disrespect and subordinate them.313 
Justice Kennedy concluded by referencing both threads of 
constitutional analysis, finding that “the right to marry is a 
fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment couples of the same-sex may not be deprived of that right 
and that liberty.”314 The sentence that arguably most clearly gives a 
holding for the decision, however, only says that “same-sex couples may 
exercise the fundamental right to marry.”315 
Many early reactions to Obergefell read the decision to rely solely 
on the Due Process Clause and marriage as a fundamental right. Some 
advocates criticized the narrowness of Justice Kennedy’s focus, and 
advocates fighting for LGBTQ equality in other areas immediately 
attempted to cabin its application to marriage alone.316 Even though 
Kennedy’s opinion for the Court discussed the stigma of not allowing 
people to marry their same-sex partners and how this demeaned any 
deviation from heterosexual norms, some states felt empowered to argue 
that the case did not apply to statutes barring same-sex couples from 
adopting, reasoning that the involvement of children took that issue 
out of Obergefell’s ambit.317 Notably, the Supreme Court apparently 
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disagreed with such a narrow reading, citing Obergefell to find in a per 
curiam opinion that states could not apply the marital presumption 
only to opposite-sex spouses.318 
If that limitation is Obergefell’s danger, the case also provides a 
methodological approach to cases involving unequal applications of 
fundamental rights. Justice Kennedy’s opinion explicitly and repeatedly 
relies upon the Equal Protection Clause, the significance of the unequal 
availability of a fundamental right, and the message that denying a 
fundamental right to a specific group sends. 
Justice Kennedy also draws significant support from how changing 
societal and broader legal norms can help to identify such unequal 
treatment of fundamental rights. This signals what Courtney Joslin has 
called “dynamic constitutionalism,” reflecting “legal, cultural, and 
social developments.”319 Justice Kennedy embraced this dynamism, 
explaining that “[w]hen new insight reveals discord between the 
Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim 
to liberty must be addressed.”320 
Some key questions to answer in the context of the constitutional 
rights of unwed biological fathers can thus be drawn from Obergefell’s 
method: has legal and societal understanding of parenting and the 
parent-child relationship changed in the last few decades in a way that 
reveals unjustified inequality? What about parenting makes it a 
fundamental right, and are any of those characteristics central only to 
mothers and married fathers? What messages does it send to treat 
unwed biological fathers so differently under the Due Process Clause? 
Another more recent Supreme Court case helps to answer these 
questions. In 2017, the Court decided Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 
again addressing a dimension of citizenship transmission.321 The lawsuit 
challenged a sub-issue: rather than facially challenging the greater 
burden placed upon unwed biological fathers to legitimate their children 
before a certain age, Luis Ramón Morales-Santana challenged residency 
requirements applied to American-citizen fathers.322 At the time that 
the statute was applied to his father, an American-citizen father had to 
be physically present in the United States for ten years, five of which 
 
fundamental constitutional right to adopt protected by the Due Process 
or Equal Protection Clauses. . . . Section 93-17-3(5) likewise does not 
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had to be after the age of fourteen.323 Americancitizen, unwed mothers, 
however, could transmit citizenship if they had lived in the United 
States for only one year.324 The facts were particularly dramatic in the 
case: José Morales, Morales-Santana’s father, had lived in Puerto Rico 
for his entire life, but moved to the Dominican Republic (and thus 
outside of the United States, although he moved to take a job with an 
American company) a mere twenty days before his nineteenth 
birthday.325 Morales-Santana was born in the Dominican Republic to 
Morales and Yrma Santana Montilla, with whom Morales had been 
living for three years.326 Morales and Montilla married when Morales-
Santana was eight years old, and Morales-Santana’s birth certificate 
was amended to list Morales as his father.327 Morales-Santana moved to 
the United States when he was thirteen years old, and lived there for 
twenty-five years until he was placed in removal proceedings.328 Had 
Morales moved from Puerto Rico to the Dominican Republic three 
weeks later, Morales-Santana would have been eligible to receive 
American citizenship through his father. Similarly, had Morales been 
the mother, instead of the father, Morales-Santana would have been 
eligible to receive American citizenship, as the statute required only one 
year of physical presence in the United States for a mother to be able 
to pass American citizenship on to her child.329 Because of the gendered 
difference in the physical presence requirement, however, Morales-
Santana was not eligible to receive American citizenship as the child of 
an American citizen and was ordered removed by an immigration judge 
to the Dominican Republic.330 
The Second Circuit reversed the immigration judge’s decision and 
held that the gendered physical presence requirements violated the 
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.331 This created a 
circuit split with the Ninth Circuit,332 in a case that the Supreme Court 
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heard but split evenly as to the result, thus affirming the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision.333 
Justice Ginsburg’s opinion for the Court in Morales-Santana, 
immediately focuses on the heart of the substantive equality issue: that 
the gendered physical presence requirement and other such gendered 
differences “date from an era when the lawbooks of our Nation were rife 
with overbroad generalizations about the way men and women are.”334 
She criticized the past justifications of such laws as reliant upon the 
“familiar stereotype” that unwed fathers “would care little about, and 
have scant contact with, their nonmarital children.”335 By contrast, the 
“unwed mother is the natural and sole guardian of a non-marital 
child.”336 Justice Ginsburg described such stereotypes as “stunningly 
anachronistic,” particularly as compared with the modern equal 
protection doctrine applying heightened scrutiny to gender-based 
classifications.337 
Notably, Justice Ginsburg’s opinion does not address the gendered 
distinction at the heart of unwed parent cases.338 The case deals only 
with the physical presence requirement,339 and Justice Ginsburg 
contrasts the requirement for unwed mothers and “fathers who have 
accepted parental responsibility,” not unwed fathers generally.340 
Further, although the Court found that the gendered physical presence 
requirement violated the Constitution,341 Justice Ginsburg concluded 
that the Court could not prevent Morales-Santana’s removal by 
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granting him citizenship.342 Instead, the Court “level[ed] down”343 by 
declaring that the longer physical presence requirement must be applied 
to all American-citizen parents, rather than only to fathers.344 
Despite the limited holding and relief, however, the Court’s opinion 
gives considerable guidance to the evaluation of constitutional parental 
rights. Historical gendered treatment of fathers and mothers was 
referred to as “the once entrenched principle of male dominance in 
marriage,”345 a legacy that has been formally eliminated through 
Obergefell’s grant of marriage equality to same-sex couples.346 Justice 
Ginsburg cited her opinion in United States v. Virginia347 to reiterate 
the Court’s “suspicion” of “overbroad generalizations” about genders.348 
Generalization about domestic roles creates “a self-fulfilling cycle of 
discrimination that force[s] women to continue to assume the role of 
primary family caregiver,”349 and “disserve[s] men who exercise 
responsibility for raising their children.”350 
Even in a decision of limited scope, therefore, Morales-Santana 
provides some of the substance to fill out Obergefell’s methodology. 
Obergefell identifies a fundamental right and asks whether the 
classification in question has any relationship to the right that would 
justify limiting the right’s availability consonant with the Equal 
Protection Clause. Morales-Santana points to the gendered stereotypes 
traditionally used to treat mothers and fathers differently and rejects 
them as illegitimate and violating equal protection. The principle is 
clear: differential treatment of unwed mothers and fathers is 
unconstitutional under the equal protection principles of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. To treat unwed parents differently according 
to their sex is an impermissible use of stereotype as a proxy for 
unrelated government interests. Such different treatment, be it in 
family law, immigration law, inheritance law, or others, must be 
rejected. 
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This approach acknowledges the fundamental right of the parent-
child relationship but does not rely upon only the fundamental right to 
challenge differential treatment of unwed fathers and mothers. By 
explicitly framing the question under the Equal Protection Clause, the 
gendered stereotypes upon which the differential treatment rests can be 
addressed directly: the unequal treatment of unwed fathers and mothers 
reflects outdated legal and social understandings. 
Obergefell’s identification of the core of a right can also be 
performed as to parentage in a way that further flags the unequal 
treatment of unwed fathers and mothers. Statutory parental laws are 
surprisingly inconsistent in identifying what parents are good parents 
or why parents are important.351 The Supreme Court gives some more 
guidance in its cases addressing the fundamental rights of parents, 
reinforcing a few different values. 
A key thread is the importance of transmitting values and 
knowledge to one’s children. A number of the earliest parental rights 
cases arose in the context of laws regulating schools, so it is unsurprising 
that the Court repeatedly discussed the importance of “the power of 
parents to control the education of their own,”352 to “direct the 
upbringing and education of children under their control,”353 and “give 
[their] children education suitable to their station in life.”354 The 
importance of educating children as to values was also emphasized, such 
as “the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements 
of good citizenship”355 and “[t]he rights of children to exercise their 
religion, and of parents to give them religious training and to encourage 
them in the practice of religious belief[.]”356 Parents provide this 
education to equip their children for the “additional obligations”357 of 
adulthood. 
Another common concern is the ability of parents to establish a 
private home, seeing decisions made within the home about the family 
as an extension of the broader right to privacy. Raising children is seen 
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as paired with “establish[ing] a home,”358 and as part of the “freedom 
of personal choice in matters of family life.”359 
Interestingly, in the context of a potential termination of the 
parental right, the Court concluded that “[e]ven when blood 
relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing 
the irretrievable destruction of their family life.”360 To some extent 
preventing the destruction of their family life underlies a number of the 
parental rights cases—for example, although a statute requiring the 
public schooling of Amish children longer than their parents wished 
primarily discussed the right of parents to control their children’s 
education, the perceived danger of the additional years of public 
schooling included a sense that the state was replacing its own 
judgment for that of the parents and teaching the children values 
contrary to those their parents would choose.361 Yet the relevance of 
strained blood relationships nonetheless generating a vital interest in 
preserving family relationships is particularly pointed when considering 
the constitutional rights of unwed biological fathers.362 
The Court has summarized these principles as “[t]he fundamental 
liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management 
of their child,”363 later slightly paraphrased as the “care, custody, and 
control of their children.”364 It is clear that these principles have nothing 
to do with the gender of the parent involved, nor with whether the 
parents are married. Nothing about the fundamental right justifies 
limiting the right to married parents and unwed mothers. The result of 
the differentiation is to underscore gendered stereotypes that men do 
not want to be fathers and do not want to be engaged parents. This is 
unconstitutionally unequal. 
B.  Implementation 
Treating fathers and mothers equally results in a single principle 
when evaluating parentage statutes: they must be provided equal 
opportunity to assert and prove legal parentage. This does not mean 
that any single parentage rule must be used to the exclusion of other 
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rules. Indeed, equalizing parentage between fathers and mothers allows 
states to continue their statutory reform and enables states to be 
flexible in adapting parentage rules to new technologies and new family 
formation norms. The consequence of the principle equalizes rules 
between fathers and mothers and is not about prioritizing biology or 
function over others in defining the fundamental right of parentage. 
Applying equal protection principles to parentage statutes also does 
not mean that all fathers must be treated the same as all mothers in all 
circumstances. For example, equal protection does not mean that giving 
birth to a child cannot be one method by which legal parentage might 
be established. It does, however, mean that the fact that most mothers 
give birth to their children cannot become a proxy rule applying to all 
mothers and all fathers. If pregnancy and giving birth is a relevant fact, 
then statutes must use that fact and not a sex or gender. 
Furthermore, to the extent that pregnancy is used, the legislative 
body using pregnancy as a rule of parentage must be clear about why. 
If pregnancy is used as shorthand for a genetic connection to the child, 
then nonpregnant parents must be allowed an opportunity to show their 
own genetic connection and be treated as equal with the pregnant 
parent. If pregnancy is used as a proxy for an opportunity to have a 
relationship with the child, then the nonpregnant parent who is present 
at birth must be treated as equal with the pregnant parent. 
Application of equal protection does not mean that one rule or 
theory of parentage must be applied above others, such as genetic 
connection outweighing functional theories. Changes to medical 
technologies, social realities, and laws affecting the regulation of families 
in other areas make identifying legal parents in a way that is helpful 
and progressing along with American families a moving target. 
As mentioned earlier, rules of parentage such as the marital 
presumption can easily be applied in a gender-neutral manner, and 
progressive application of the marital presumption to same-sex couples 
has made it easier for female spouses of women who give birth to be 
identified as the second legal mother from the time of birth. Equalizing 
parentage rules between men and women would also provide more 
avenues for fathers in same-sex relationships, as well as all unwed 
partners. 
There is one group of parents that could be negatively affected: 
adoptive parents, at least those who adopt with only the consent of an 
unmarried mother. This is a relatively small group for practical 
purposes, since unmarried fathers have more avenues to assert their 
legal parentage under state law than before. There are some 
circumstances, however, where an infant could be placed for adoption 
without the father’s knowledge or consent, either because the father is 
unaware of the pregnancy or because the mother took advantage of a 
safe haven law. Such laws establish locations where infants can be safely 
abandoned into the custody of the state without the abandoning parent 
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being charged with neglect.365 Crucially, however, the laws are gender 
neutral: they do not establish that only mothers may leave children in 
such safe havens, nor that the father’s consent is unnecessary. Such 
laws thus do not necessarily present an equal protection problem, but 
rather a question of whether the ability of one parent to relinquish a 
child without identifying the other parent violates the fundamental 
right of the other parent. 
The advantage of dynamic constitutionalism is that it allows courts 
to acknowledge application of core rights to novel and changing 
scenarios, and application of equal protection does nothing to change 
that. Application of equal protection also allows for experimentation 
between states as well as different policy goals to justify different rules 
at the state versus federal level. But whatever theories of parentage 
Congress or state legislatures apply, they must not use sex or gender 
stereotypes as a proxy for nongendered facts. 
C.  Potential Objections 
As a first line response, there are many self-identified feminist 
scholars who argue that differential treatment of mothers and fathers 
is appropriate or desirable for the law. Mary Becker described “a 
conspiracy of silence [that] forbids discussion of what is common 
knowledge: mothers are usually emotionally closer to their children than 
fathers”366 in the context of arguing that courts should defer to a 
mother’s decision as to custody arrangements for children at divorce.367 
Katharine Silbaugh wrote of her concern that constitutionalizing a 
formal equality approach would prevent experimentation with 
parentage rules, potentially including maternalist perspectives and 
rules.368 This perspective is obviously fundamentally at odds with this 
Article’s thesis, that unwed fathers and mothers should be treated 
equally under the law in parentage determinations. The thesis, however, 
is a feminist one: to the extent that parentage laws underscore gender 
stereotypes, particularly the second-stereotype unwed-father principle 
that men are unwilling fathers, those gender stereotypes are also 
wielded against women. The argument that women are more natural or 
more skilled mothers, in other words, supports propositions that women 
be encouraged or coerced to take on more caregiving responsibilities, 
that women’s economic activity is less important than their caregiving  
365. Purvis, supra note 142, at 678. 
366. Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. 
Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 133, 137 (1992). 
367. Id. at 139. Becker acknowledged that fathers could perform similar 
caregiving work and potentially form emotionally close relationships with 
their children but referred to those fathers as “mother[ing].” Id. at 150. 
368. Katharine B. Silbaugh, Miller v. Albright: Problems of 
Constitutionalization in Family Law, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 1139, 1156 (1999). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 69·Issue 3·2019 
The Constitutionalization of Fatherhood 
598 
activities, and that the historical division of labor pushing men towards 
the workforce and women towards the home has roots in truth rather 
than mere stereotype. In my previous work, I have identified myself as 
a social constructionist feminist scholar, and this argument continues 
my work in that vein.369 This may not convince feminists who support 
differential gendered treatment, but at least the basis of our 
disagreement is clear. 
A second vein of criticism is best represented by Jennifer Hendricks, 
who has criticized what she terms “genetic essentialism” in laws 
regulating parentage, meaning “an emphasis on genes as the essence of 
parenthood.”370 Hendricks argues that existing treatment of unwed 
biological fathers “already accommodates men’s unique biology” more 
than women’s, so equality between the sexes does not require 
incorporating a genetic relationship into the legal or constitutional 
definition of parentage.371 As Hendricks explains, “[a]s a matter of 
formal sex equality, a genetic tie alone need not confer parental rights. 
As the Supreme Court has held, the man with a merely genetic tie is 
not similarly situated to the woman who has given birth.”372 As 
discussed above, however, Hendricks is factually correct: being pregnant 
and giving birth to a child, while usually occurring simultaneously with 
being the genetic mother of a child, is not necessarily the case. A 
gestational surrogate is clearly not similarly situated with a man whose 
sperm was used to create the fetus. To the extent that one is persuaded 
that genetic essentialism is a harm, that speaks to the substance of 
parentage laws and whether any genetic connection to a child should 
be included. It does not determine, however, whether existing laws treat 
men and women equally. I argue that it would be constitutional, in 
other words, for a state to create a parentage scheme that eliminated 
genetic ties entirely, as long as each substantive rule is not used as an 
imperfect proxy for gender. 
Another concern argues that strengthening fathers’ constitutional 
rights gives fathers increased power in custody fights in a way that will 
harm both women and children. Status as a legal parent does not 
guarantee that a parent receives custody or visitation rights with a 
child, but it allows the parent to ask (and potentially to fight) for 
custody or visitation rights. Attempts to constitutionalize the custody 
fight itself have been unsuccessful,373 so at the moment status as a legal 
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parent effectively operates as a gatekeeper for further conflict: legal 
parentage act as standing to further pursue parental rights.374 June 
Carbone and Naomi Cahn have argued that unmarried parents have 
potentially chosen not to marry because the mother recognizes the 
presumption that married parents are equal parents in the eyes of the 
law and wants to avoid it.375 The rights of married parents tend to be 
one-size-fits-all,376 whereas unmarried couples have a range of 
relationship models. Carbone and Cahn argue that: 
[C]ourts increasingly impose such shared parenting arrangements 
on couples who barely know each other, disagree fundamentally 
on how to parent, and often cannot stand to be in the same room 
together; or, even if they cooperate perfectly well, they have 
simply elected that their co-parenting relationship consist of 
different terms from those the law would ordinarily impose.377  
To the extent that recognizing more unwed biological fathers as 
legal fathers imposes those terms on more families, not only would 
the perceived choices of the mothers be disregarded, but such 
conflict would be magnified among parents with resources to fight 
over custody and visitation in court.378 
Such concerns are significant, since there is no question that 
recognizing more legal parents at the very least opens the door to more 
custody fights and a prolonged legal relationship between two parents 
who may not want to have any relationship with each other. 
Acknowledging the breadth of the equality concern, however, indicates 
that the question of custody may be a narrower one. The solution may 
be reforms to how custody is determined, in other words, rather than 
continuing to grant more mothers than fathers constitutional rights. 
Several family law scholars in recent years have been questioning 
whether it makes sense to treat parental rights and responsibilities as a 
single, indivisible package, as opposed to a “bundle of sticks” that might 
be broken apart.379 
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Another potential danger is that, by equalizing the treatment of 
unwed fathers and mothers, it will become more difficult for unwed 
mothers to be identified as legal parents rather than easier for unwed 
fathers to do so. This would have particularly harmful consequences in 
cases involving the transmission of citizenship and inheritance, where 
by the time a case arises the clock of parental identification has already 
run out. Such a remedy would be the leveling down seen in Sessions v. 
Morales-Santana,380 rather than leveling up to recognize more parent-
child links. 
In Morales-Santana, however, Justice Ginsburg wrote that the 
Court could not impose a shorter physical presence requirement upon 
fathers because that would not have been the intent of Congress.381 Such 
logic might similarly be imposed in the context of other transmission of 
citizenship cases, which would have to be addressed by Congress. Such 
an intent—to find fewer legal parents, leaving children with fewer 
sources of support and reliant on the public fix—seems much less 
plausible in the context of family law and inheritance law cases. If the 
differential treatment of unwed fathers and mothers rests upon 
stereotyped views of men as unwilling fathers, it is more logical for 
courts to reject the stereotype, rather than impose that stereotype upon 
mothers as well. 
There are also broader criticisms of the expanding 
constitutionalization of family law. Scholars have argued that 
constitutionalizing family law disadvantages vulnerable family 
members382 as well as unconventional family structures.383 Others, 
however, have argued that family law is already constitutional––that, 
even in law school, famous constitutional law cases arising out of family 
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law questions are not viewed as family law.384 The rich history of 
constitutional family law is cast as “establish[ing] boundaries or outer 
limits for permissible family laws,”385 which contributes to devaluing 
family law itself,386 when in fact family law is already constitutionalized. 
Family law is in a dialogic relationship with constitutional law, in which 
the evolution of family law helped to evolve constitutional law, not the 
reverse.387 
Conclusion 
The Supreme Court has yet to revisit its family law cases from the 
1970s that established a starkly different constitutional status for 
unwed biological fathers as compared to unwed biological mothers. One 
reason may be that few such cases arise, after state legislatures amended 
their parentage statutes to eliminate some of the most explicit 
differentiations that sparked previous constitutional challenge. 
The impact of the Court’s family law doctrine, however, is still 
vibrant today. The unwed-father principles have significantly impacted 
immigration and inheritance law, among others. A core rejection of 
equality principles as applied to parents continues to operate within 
broader constitutional challenges to laws touching upon the family in 
all sorts of contexts, operating to treat unwed biological fathers as less 
significant under the Constitution. 
If the broader impact of the Court’s family law doctrine is the why, 
then recent cases demonstrate the how, illustrating how future courts 
should analyze questions that implicate both fundamental and equality 
rights. Only once courts revisit the equality claims of unwed biological 
fathers and reject the gendered views of the past will unwed biological 
fathers truly become constitutional fathers. 
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